

164 A. 10



MEMORANDUM

ON THE

NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF BENGAL.

BY

ALEXANDER MACKENZIE,

OFFICIAL AND JUNIOR SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL.

Calcutta:

CENSAL SECRETARIAT PRESS.

1869.

5045

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MEMORANDUM

THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF BENGAL.

THE hills which border either side of the Assam Valley are the *habitat* of various warlike and uncivilized tribes with whom, since the close of the first Burmese war, the British Government has had more or less to do. With those dwelling on the Sub-Himalayan ranges, we have not on the whole cultivated intimate relations. There was little to gain by doing so. There was work to be found elsewhere. Our chief attention has been concentrated on that great mountain system which, commencing where the Brahmaputra turns suddenly to the south, interposes between Assam and the regulation Districts of Dymessing, Sylhet, and Cachar,—a broad and well nigh impenetrable belt of hill and plateau. These ranges next run east and north, filling up the angle between the Brahmaputra and the Irrawaddi. Then turning southward they border the Irrawaddi Valley on the west through 12 degrees of latitude to its mouth at Cape Negrais.

The River Moussas, rising in the Bootan Hills, falls into the Brahmaputra nearly opposite Gowalpara, and forms the western boundary of North Assam, separating the District of North Kamroop from the Cooch Behar Commissionership. The Bor Nuddi, which meets the Brahmaputra opposite Gowhatti, divides North Kamroop from Durrung, and this again is separated from North Luckimpore by the River Kuboojan.

The hills which form the northern boundary of the three Districts we have named are those in which we may begin our survey of the North-Eastern Frontier. We do not propose to touch upon the general relations subsisting between our Government and the Governments of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, because those States are in no sense subordinate to us. We are in no way responsible for their management, and our intercourse with them is confined to limits laid down by Treaty. We decline absolutely to admit that we have at present a "Mission" to these nations. They are as foreign to British India as are the men of Afghanistan. The Cooch Behar Commissionership has to do on the north only with the three States abovenamed, and hence we have commenced our task on its most easterly border.

North Kamroop Bhutias.—Indeed, we might almost have passed by the District of North Kamroop also, inasmuch as the only hill tribe with which its authorities come in contact are the Bhutias of the Kamroop Dwaras, or Passes.

These Dwaras are five in number—Bijni, Chappakamur, Chappaguri, Banska, and Ghuc-kulca. On our taking possession of Assam, we found them in the hands of various Bhutia Jungpans, who paid a nominal tribute to the Assam Rajah. But as every authority in Bhutan does what is right in his own eyes until he is made to do otherwise, it may be supposed that the payments to the imbecile Native Government of Assam were not particularly regular. A system of gang robbery too had been organized under the auspices of the Bhutia Soubahs, by which the ryots of the low country were kept in a state of constant alarm. This state of things continued for some time after the British Government had assumed the management of the District. Numerous punitive expeditions and many fruitless negotiations were undertaken. Unable to realize a state of complete anarchy where all the forms of Government existed, we always believed that could we but reach the central authority in Bhutan, the peace of the border might be effectually secured. It was not, therefore, till 1841 that the Governor General became convinced that more decisive measures were required. In that year the whole of the Assam Dwaras, comprising about 1,600 square miles of territory, were annexed to British India. The Jungpens, who had hitherto drawn their revenues from the Dwaras, were thus deprived of their means of subsistence. Our choice lay now between making these men desperate foes or converting them into harmless stipendiaries. A sum of Rupees 10,000 per annum was accordingly paid to the Bhutias as compensation for these resumed lands. Time showed the wisdom of the step. North Kamroop for twenty years suffered only from the devastations of its rivers. How the peace of the frontier was broken by the just retribution exacted by the British Government for outrages committed on the side of Bengal, it is not necessary here to tell. We need only note that inasmuch as theoretically the allowance for the Assam Dwaras was made to the Central Government, its disbursement was at once stopped when war broke out. On the return of peace a similar arrangement was made for the whole of the Bhutan Dwaras, and the Assam allowance merged in the general treaty grant, which is paid only to Officers deputed by the Central Government. At present the hope that this support would create a strong central power in Bhutan has not been realized. The outlying Chiefs who formerly shared in the distribution of the stipend, or rather levied their own shares therefrom as it passed through their hands, now find themselves overlooked. They fortunately have had too salutary a lesson to venture to reimburse themselves in British territory. But swooping down on the unfortunate Deb and Dhurm Rajahs at Head-Quarters, they have reduced the country to a state of anarchy and confusion, in which, if British interference be delayed, an invasion from Tibet would be rather a boon.

Darrung.—Crossing the Bor Nuddi in our eastward progress we enter the District of Darrung. This District has five great local divisions, Desh Darrung, Chatgari, Chutea, Chardwar, and Nowdwar. Desh Darrung and Chutea lie to the south of the District upon the Brahmaputra; and with them we have here no concern. North of Desh Darrung lies Chatgari, and in the country between Chatgari and the hills are the Dwaras of Kulling, Buriguma, and Kuxipara. Kulling and Buriguma, with the

Two Kamroop Dwaras already enumerated, were at the time of our occupation subject to the Dewangiri Rajah and the Singpo People, and nominally to the Central Government of Bhutan. But while the Kamroop Dwaras were entirely under Bhutan control, Kalling and Bariguma were held by the Bhuteas for only eight months in each year, and by the Assam Rajahs for the other four.* The consequences to the unhappy cultivators of such a mode of management may easily be imagined. These Dwaras were resumed along with those of Kamroop, with the same happy results.

In Kariapara Dwar we come in contact with a different element altogether. The Thibet Bhuteas, who are locally the dominant race, are subject to a body of Chiefs known as the "Sath Rajahs," and these again owe allegiance to the Towang Rajah, who is himself a tributary of Lhasa. Here then the British frontier in Assam may be almost said to march with that of Thibet. The Sath Rajahs, after their manner, oppressed the helpless Cachari and Assamese ryots of the plains, and in 1844 the British Government bought out the Bhutea claims for an annual sum of Rupees 5,000.

This Dwar forms the great avenue down which the hillmen pour to the celebrated fair of Udalgiri. "Sixty years ago," writes the present Commissioner of Assam, "the trade between Thibet and Assam by this route was estimated to amount to two lakhs of Rupees per annum, and this though Assam was then in a most unsettled state: and up to the time just prior to the Burmese invasion, the Lhasa merchants brought down gold to the value of Rupees 70,000. The occupation of the country by the Burmese, however, killed the trade, and in 1883 only two Thibetan merchants are said to have come down, but since that period there has been a gradual revival of it which even our late quarrel with Bootan did not interrupt, and it has now every appearance of being flourishing and on the increase.

"I visited the fair in 1887, and again this year, and was much interested by what I saw there of the Thibetan traders. I found men among them from all parts of Thibet, from Lhasa, and other places east and west, and even north of it. Some of them looked like Chinamen; they wore Chinese dresses, ate with chopsticks, and had about them various articles of Chinese manufacture, as pipes, strike-a-lights, and embroidered purses, such as I have seen in use among the Chinese at Rangoon and Moulmein; they were accompanied in some cases by their families, and carried their goods on sturdy ponies, of which they had a great number—I should think some hundreds."

This promising avenue of Central Asian trade will doubtless attract ere long the attention which it merits. The annual stipend of the Sath Rajahs is spent at the fair, and finds its way in the shape of cotton and other goods towards Towang and Lhasa. In 1882, one of these Rajahs, called the Gelling, fled to our protection to avoid certain demands of his Thibetan superiors. A Tartar army was pushed up to within a few miles of our frontier, and but for the resolute face shown by the local British troops, Assam would once more have

been the field of a great invasion. These facts are somewhat foreign to the subject, but they are worth noting.*

The extensive division of Char Dwar is said to have taken its name from its having been annually spoiled by four different races, the Assamese, Independent Bhotas, the Bhotas, the Akhas, and the Daphlas. The Bhotas here

found are the subjects of the Sat Rajahs of Rooprai Garo and Sher Garo, all of whom are subordinate to their principal Chief called Dargoo Rajah. They claim to be independent of Tawang. From 1839 to 1844 the British Government excluded them from entering the Dwar to trade, as a punishment for outrages committed by them. On their submitting, they were granted moderate pensions in lieu of the black mail, which they, like the other hill tribes on this frontier, used to levy on the ryots.

The most easterly tribe of Bhotas are the Thobengas. They live in the interior of the hills, and formerly levied black mail in Char Dwar along with the Rooprai Bhotas. A bitter feud however sprang up between these tribes, and for years they only entered Assam to trade with the Koriapara Dwar. Their annual visit to purchase goods was made to a mart called Makhai in Char Dwar. Their chief village is said to be sixteen days' journey from the plains. They receive a small annual pension of about Rupees 140.

The Akhas are the people whom we next meet. They are of two septs: (1.) The Hazari Khawa Akhas—the "eaters of a thousand hearths."

(2.) The Kappachor Akhas—the "thieves who lurk amid the cotton plants." These are a most energetic and savage tribe, who for twenty years spread terror throughout Durnag, while with the aid of the Meechis, a fierce and roguish race in the interior, they defied the power of the Tawang Rajah in the hills. Both tribes of Akhas together did not in 1844 number over 200 families, while the Meechis were said to amount to three or four hundred households. The Hazari Khawas levied "Posa" or black mail on the plains, and got to the ryots who refused their demand. The Kappachors were looked on more as outlaws, and though they had no quasi legal claim to "Posa" yet the name of their Chief, the Dhangri or Dhangri Rajah, was a word of power along the border, a bugbear with which to frighten the village children. In 1839 this formidable ringleader was captured, and for four years kept close in Gowharri Jail. In 1843, however, the Governor General's Agent released him, on the vain hope that clemency might secure obedience. He fled to the hills, rallied his broken clan, put to death all who had been in any way concerned in his capture, and brought his career to its climacteric in 1835 by setting up a British out-post at Baleopara, massacring therein men, women, and children. For seven years after this he evaded capture, and his tribe remained outlawed in the jungles of the hills. At length weary of being hunted he surrendered. To have slain him judicially in cold blood would have been of little use. The influence with that of the other Chiefs, who also at this time came in, was made

* The agreement with the Koriapara Bhotas will be found at page 145, Vol. I, of Aitchison's Treaties.

† This is a common Bhotia title along this frontier.

‡ Their agreement is printed at page 146, Vol. I, Aitchison's Treaties.

use of to secure the future peace of the Char Doh. Small pensions were granted. Solemn oaths were sworn, "the Chiefs taking into their hands the skin of a tiger, that of a bear, and elephant's dung, and killing a fowl." * To ten Akhas' credit be it said, the oaths have been kept. The arrangement cost Government Rupees 300 per annum.

The last of the Darrung Hill tribes is the Duphlas, who are found also in East Luckimpore. The Duphlas are not so much a single tribe as a collection of numerous cognate petty clans, independent of each other and quite incapable of combined action. In the time of the Assam Rajah they had however established a system under which certain plain villages were allotted to each clan, to which it paid an annual visit for the purpose of collecting stated dues of black mail. From each freeman's house they took goods and cash amounting in value to Rupees 8. The Gachai slaves paid 5 Rupees each family. For some years after our taking possession of Assam the Duphlas were a constant trouble. Their fearless raids and numberless atrocities compelled the establishment of a line of Military posts all along the frontier; and it was only after long and tedious negotiation that in 1836-37 their claims were commuted for money payments to the Gams or Chicis, amounting to about Rupees 2,500. The result has been perfectly satisfactory. The Duphlas have many of them settled permanently in the plains and become peaceful cultivators in the villages they once harried.

The "Posa" or black mail which, under the Assam Government, was paid to most of the hill tribes bordering on the plains, was not, as has been sometimes imagined, an uncertain, ill-defined exaction depending entirely upon the rapacity of the different hordes who might descend to levy it, but was really a fixed, well ascertained revenue payment, on account of which a corresponding remission was made in the rent of the ryot satisfying it. Whether it arose from pre-existent claims in the soil asserted by the hillmen, or was imposed originally by them in the days of the weakness of the Ahom Kings, we cannot tell. It had existed time out of mind, when we annexed Assam, and what the British Government did was to stop the direct collection of the stated dues from the ryots by the hillmen themselves—a practice which, as might be expected from the characters of both, led to many quarrels; and to pay the amount to the tribes in the hills or at established marts, collecting at the same time the full rent from the ryots. The power of the purse being thus held by the same authority who wielded the power of the sword to the terror of evil-doers, the hill tribes have accepted regular payments, and peaceful lives, in lieu of wild tax gathering forays and quarrels on the plains.

Luckimpore.—The Division of Luckimpore Proper, which we now enter, lies between the Rivers Kabigan and Dehing, and is intersected from north to south by the River Sabumshiri.†

* *Atchut*, Vol. I. page 148-9.

† The District of Luckimpore contains also the Divisions of Nuttuck and Suddya. An interesting account of visit to tribes of Hill Mairs on the Sabumshiri will be found in Vol. XIV. of the *Journal of the Asiatic Society*.

The hills which form the northern boundary of Lushimpore Proper are in their western part inhabited by Duphas, as we have already seen. Beyond the Daphin eastward we find in the same range a tribe known as the upper range Abors, to whom in former days the Miris owed some kind of tribute, but who are now altogether extinct. The Abor clans are numerous, savage, and daring. They are found from 91° to 93° E. Longitude. The Miris do not appear to have extended beyond the Dehing. In the neighbourhood of the Dehing and the Tezong, the Abors keep out on the lower hills, and seem to have held in command of the Dohas and Plains, fighting many a sore battle with the Khamptis, who about the year 1250 first entered the valley from the side of Burmah. The Hill-Miris and a few Abor Chiefs claimed that most of the lowland villages, but most of the Abor clans in the interior had no such rights, probably because this corner of Assam had never been rich enough to make it worth their while to visit them. The black mail claims which did exist, were commuted by the British Government for annual money payments as had been done elsewhere. The Miris are now to be found as peaceful cultivators and indefatigable jungle clearers all over Lushimpore and even in Sadiya and Matak. The original Assamese inhabitants to the North of the Brahmaputra have been gradually thrust across that river partly by dread of Abor raids, but mainly by the advance of the Miri settlers. The Miris themselves, relieved by the presence of British troops at Sadiya and other frontier posts from the position of mere dependents upon the Abors in which they were wont to live, have become extremely prosperous both as traders and cultivators, and have had wit enough to turn the tables on their old masters, by constituting themselves the main channel of communication between the Abors and the British Authorities, and the source from which the former draw most of their supplies.

During the last ten years, the relations of the British Government with the Abors have been not altogether satisfactory. In January 1858 the Bor Mayong Abors living far up the Dehing massacred a Berah* village on the north of the Brahmaputra, only six miles from Dibrugarh. An expedition was presently despatched to follow up the raiders, but owing to the extremely inaccessible nature of the country and some mistakes on the part of the Officers conducting the force, it did not succeed in reaching the offending village, and returned not without difficulty, and with some loss of credit. The Bor Mayongs becoming bold by impunity took up a more advanced position towards the plains, and it became absolutely necessary to devise some means of punishing their insolence and protecting British Districts from future attack. Proposals for establishing a line of posts with a connecting road were submitted to Government, and it was determined to organise an expedition into the hills on such a scale as should infallibly command success. Meantime the Meite Abors, a friendly clan, had offered to become the medium of communication between the British and the Meyongs. Nothing however came of this, as it was impossible for Government to overlook the events of the past, or to accept anything but a complete submission to such terms as it might dictate. In November 1858 the Secretary of State forbade any expedition into

* The Berahs or Berahs are a peculiar section of Hindu Jains who were driven from the Dohas by the Abors and other tribes.

the Alor Hills have not been worthy of mention, and with an exception of force. The very same intention was not to be in force with the course of action already determined upon, and in February 1893, the expedition marched into the hills, destroyed completely the Alor Stockade, and everything before it. In such a country however no comprehensive scheme of operations was feasible, and having reached the city centre that would be of advantage, the force retired. Later in the year a strong force according to the survey of the whole Alor Frontier between Teesa and Lasee Sema, and for a year or two was had little or no further trouble.

Towards the close of 1891, the Moyang Alor again massacred a Beah village on the south side of the Brakins river, some from Lasee Sema. The plan seemed to have been that certain Mini Colonies had aided and assisted the Alors in these attacks. These Beahs were part of a body of ryots who had deserted the north side of the river in 1858 after the former Alor massacre, and the railway was said to have been designed partly to show them that they were not beyond reach, and partly to take vengeance for aid rendered to the British troops in the Campaign of 1841. The Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow proposed to deport the Mins who had aided the Alor Hills on the line of country on the Alor side, to the south side of the river, and thus to deprive the Alors of the main support and the covert assistance rendered them by these hostile allies. It was further suggested to complete the line of road and the fortified posts already alluded to, and by means of a Military expedition to occupy the Alor Hills for a season. The wisdom of the first proposal is not very apparent, for the very Mins whom it was intended to deport were the only forces on whom Government could depend to make the forts and roads required. The forts had been already sanctioned by the Bengal Government, but their erection was stopped on financial considerations by the Public Works Department of the Government of India. Now, however, the proposals of the Local Officers were cordially taken up by the Lieutenant-Governor. The Public Works Department was ordered to complete the forts and roads by contract labour. The road was to be maintained and improved, and complete proposals were laid before the Government for retaining by means of troops, forts, and funds, the Military command of the whole Alor frontier. The importance of this step to the Alor interests in the British and Mutual Division can be seen at once by a glance at the map.

The mode of preparation did not fail to attract the notice of the Alor and Moyang officials, and they were accordingly made by them. The Lieutenant-Governor directed that all advances should be carefully received, and an attempt was ordered to be made to obtain a binding agreement with the Alor, who should secure the peace of the frontier by the future. But the Alor were to be allowed to do so who undertook to prevent by force or by their own kindred class, to keep up a Police for the protection of the road and to see that no further Alor attacks were made. All arrangements with the British Government were to be made by the Alor, and the Alor was to be prepared to the Military preparations already begun. We could only object to consult by being at the same time strong. Accordingly in November 1892 Major Blyer, Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, met the Moyang Alor Chiefs at Lasee Sema, and after prolonged negotiations an agreement was signed on 15th November 1892, which other Alor chiefs subsequently joined in. The agreement is not

have an intense dread. At this meeting it transpired that the increased price of salt at Suddya had caused much discontent among the tribes, and that as a fit of ill humour the Mecho Abors had even the agreement entered into with Major Bivar. Those however who attended took their allowances, and expressed their intention of remaining friendly. The meeting of 1866 passed off quietly, and was only marked by the coming in of the Bor Abors, a very influential clan who had hitherto held aloof. The Moyangs were again absent, but sent in a demand that the posts at Peban Maska should be abandoned. This of course was refused, and the guards along the frontier were strengthened in case this clan should attempt any hostile action. Nothing however followed, and up to date the aboriginal tribes have been perfectly well behaved, frequenting our markets, and meeting our Officers without suspicion and with the greatest cordiality.

That these people are amenable to kindly influences is proved by the fact that in 1856-57, the Revd Mr. Higgin, a Clergyman at Debraogun, obtained much influence over them, and to their villages he paid annual visits under the escort of the young men of the tribe. He also settled some Abor immigrants near Debraogun.

The hills which close the north-east corner of the Assam Valley are inhabited by various tribes of Mishmees. Between the foot of the hills and the British Out-posts stretches a broad and densely belt of jungle some twenty miles deep, and through this run the paths by which the Mishmees come to purchase salt and cloth at our established marts. We have no formal agreements with any of these tribes, and our information regarding them is comparatively scanty. They occupy the almost inaccessible country lying between Assam and Lama or Thibet. Any who are curious to know more about their habitat, must refer to No. XXIII. of the published selections from the records of the Bengal Government, and to volume XVII. of the Asiatic Society's Researches. We are acquainted with three great branches of this tribe. The Chuketta or crop-haired Mishmees, the Tain or Pagaroo Mishmees, and the still more remote Mezhor or Mulhi Mishmees. We are told that in 1856, the Mezhor, aided by a Lama force, attacked the Tain Mishmees, and devastated their villages. Of other tribal movements in the interior hills we know little or nothing.

In 1854, two French Missionaries, M. M. Krick and Barray, endeavoured to penetrate into the Mezhor Mishmee country to Thibet. They were escorted safely to the border by some Mezhor Chiefs, but were pursued and barbarously murdered by an indigenous party of Mishmees, under one Kasee-sha, who overtook the unfortunate gentlemen in a Thibetan

FOURTEENTH.—In event of Moyang Abors infraction or failing to fulfil any of the provisions of this engagement, it will be considered void and will no longer have effect.

FIFTEENTH.—The original of this engagement, which is drawn up in English, will remain with the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, Upper Assam, and a counterpart or copy will be furnished to the aboriginal Mecho Abors.

SIXTEENTH.—In ratification of the above engagement, contained in 16th paragraph, the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, Assam, on behalf of the British Government, puts his hand and seal to the record of Headmen or Chiefs of the different tribes or communities of the Moyang Abors after their signatures or marks, this 5th day of November in A. D. 1862.

(Sd.) H. S. Bivar, Major.

Deputy Commr. First Div., Luckimpore, Upper Assam

and Agent, Governor General's L. P. Office.

(Here follow signatures of 54 Chiefs in account of 5 different Khels.)

village where they were awaiting permission to proceed further. The motive of this murder was simply a desire for plunder, as the Missionaries were known to have with them much valuable baggage. The news reached Assam in November. It seemed almost hopeless to attempt to punish the murderers. But both the Local Officers and Government felt that to overlook such a deed, committed though it was in Thibet itself, would injure our prestige with all the border tribes. The neighbouring Mishmees themselves urged us to retribution, and the call was not disregarded. Accordingly in the latter end of February 1855 a little body of twenty Assam Light Infantry with forty Khamptee Volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant Eden, entered the hills. For eight days they pressed on and up, swinging themselves across dangerous torrents on bridges of single canes, climbing for hours at a time in bitter cold, and without water; until at length about four o'clock one morning they arrived at Kai-ee-sha's village. To carry it in face of a flight of poisoned arrows was the work of five minutes. Kai-ee-sha was taken alive; his sons fell fighting; his daughters surrendered; his village fled; and the triumphant little band retired more slowly to the plains, cutting away the bridges behind them as they passed. This brilliant exploit has not yet been forgotten in the North-Eastern Hills by the Tai and Mezhoo Mishmees. The Chulkattas, however, have now and then given trouble. They seem indeed more hopelessly savage than any other tribe, and for years they perpetrated a series of outrages upon the Suddya villages.

In April 1855 three servants of Lieutenant Eden's were carried off by the Chulkattas, but were recovered through the agency of a friendly Chief. Towards the close of 1855, the same tribe made a sudden attack upon a village near Suddya, killing two and kidnapping others of the inhabitants. Again friendly Mishmees came forward to recover the captives and punish the aggressors. The Chulkattas were common foes to all. In January 1857, another attack was made by them, and a village cut up within hearing of the Sepoy guard at Suddya, who made no effort to drive them off. While measures were being concerted for a punitive expedition, the mutiny broke out, and all such undertakings were postponed. In October 1857, the Chulkattas rendered bold impunity again sacked an outlying house. The month after they massacred the Khamptee village of Chowkeng Gohain, while most of the males were away with the Assistant Commissioner establishing outposts to check their attacks. Stealing through the jungles and watching their opportunity, these wretches, who have naturally the greatest dread of fire-arms, murdered women and children and disappeared before our guards could reach the scene of the atrocity. Enquiry showed that this attack on the Khampteers was designed as revenge for the death by cholera of some of the Chulkattas on a friendly visit to Chowkeng Gohain. This last outrage roused the Khamptee tribes to their own defence, and shortly afterwards the Mishmees were more than once driven back with loss when advancing down the jungle paths towards the villages.

Again, in the beginning of 1866, the Chulkatta Mishmees attacked the village of Chowkeng Gohain, and though beaten off with loss, yet left their mark behind them. Arms had been supplied to these Khamptee villagers by Government, and they were as a rule well able to defend themselves. Government now, however, approved of a more extended scheme of village defence. A good Frontier Militia was better fitted to keep these savages in check than any number of regular posts, and a Khamptee Colony was forthwith settled at an advanced spot towards the Dikrang, a certain number of its members being fully armed for its defence. Since this was done, the Chulkatta Mishmees have had no trouble.

This seems a good place to review generally the policy of Government towards the tribes of the northern boundary of Assam. We have seen that as regards those tribes who had long established claims upon the plains, that policy has been one of fair and equitable dealing. While maintaining a force strong enough to punish any wanton aggression, we have refrained from creating unnecessary foes, and have scrupulously made good to the hillmen all that of which we deprived them by assuming the government of Assam. We have, however, made them clearly to know that the payment of their dues is contingent on their good behaviour, and that the strong arm of British power is for ever interposed between them and the evils they once oppressed. At the same time we have welcomed them as cultivators in the plains, and we have seen whole communities of border bandits settle down into peaceful tillers of the soil. Not a trace of a policy of "extermination and repression" can be found by the most bitter enemy of the English in India. The sound sense on which these arrangements are based is stamped, moreover, with the seal of perfect success. Karimgo and Durrung have for years been as undisturbed as the 24 Pergunnahs. Nor is the case much altered when we come to the wilder tribes living near Lachimpore. We have said nothing of the Singphos and Khampties, who are settled in large numbers on the fertile plains of that District. We need only now mention the Mizo who seem destined to hold all the District north of the Brahmaputra. But even as regards the Abors, a fierce and uncouth race with whom we have been brought into sharp conflict, we find little to carp at in the policy pursued. We freely admit that we may any day see ourselves involved in war with the Abors and perhaps the Mizo. It is the work of time to make such savages understand a policy of conciliation, and the time has hitherto been short. In dealing with them the first necessity is to ensure that they do not oppress us. Hence the punishment for any outrage must be and usually has been summary and severe. But our aim as a whole has been conciliatory. Some are disposed to scoff at the consequences of this policy, and to deride the Government for endeavouring to conceal what these critics call a weak system of bribery under the name and pretence of payments for Police services. Now it will be remembered that the payments to the Abors at any rate are not money payments to the Chiefs, but payments in kind to the whole community. Where the constitution of a tribe is patriarchal or aristocratical, payments to the Chiefs suffice. There is no difference in principle, but the variation in the expression shows what the principle really is. It may be, and no doubt is, true that with the sums of for the sums to paid no organized Police Establishment is kept up by the Abors. It was never expected that they would appear (howsoever in red turbans and loincloths) in well found station houses. But what was expected was, that they would adopt their own rude means of securing a quiet frontier, and would take such steps as were in their judgment necessary, and in accordance with their tribal organization to prevent the evil disposed among the tribes from doing any act which is contrary to the understanding under which the payment is made, they are bound to prevent. As a matter of fact, we have evidence from the mouths of the Abors themselves, that the desired effect was produced in the very first year of the agreements, and an attack on the day proposed by some tribes was prevented by the rest. The following passages then show the policy of thus dealing with these tribes was put by Government in 1865.

The essential difference between "black mail" and the annual allowances paid to the Abors is this: that in the one case the forbearance of the savage tribe is made by them conditional on payment of the stipulated allowance, and in the other the payment of the

allowance is made by us conditional on the good conduct of the tribe. The one is initiated in an aggressive spirit, the other in a spirit of conciliation.

It is an arrangement of this kind which was made in the last century with the Aborigines of the Rajmatal Hills, who had previously been the terror of the surrounding country, whose successive Military expeditions had failed to subdue, but who, under the operation of an annual payment conditional on good conduct, have remained perfectly quiet and peaceable ever since. It is true that the amount of the allowance paid to the Rajmatal Hill Chiefs is considerably greater than the value of the presents made to the Abors, but the principle is the same, and is as certain to be efficacious in one case as it is in the other, provided the allowance be sufficient to compensate the tribe in their own estimation for the advantage they might gain by the occasional plunder of a border village—an advantage which they well know is materially qualified by the risk of reprisals.

It is very desirable that the younger men of the tribe should be induced, if possible, to take service in the Police, and that the hill tribes generally should be employed in this manner, for after a certain degree of training and education; not only are they by their physique better qualified than the people of the plains for most of the duties required of the Police in frontier Districts, but their employment sets free the labor of others accustomed to industrial occupations.

What is of the utmost importance in dealing with uncivilized tribes is patience. No one supposes that their civilization is to be effected in a few years, and no one expects that in endeavoring to civilize them the Government will not meet with occasional disappointment, but the policy is none the less on this account sound and intelligible.

With the majority of the Mishmee tribes we have had none but casual trading intercourse. They make no friends or enemies directly, and they do not in any way molest us. The Chinthees appear to get on fairly with all the other tribes, and owing to the difficult nature of their country we must trust to a good system of village defence and to the good offices of the neighboring tribes to protect or punish their occasional incursions. They are too distant to excite our jealousy, and too inaccessible to coerce. Our policy must, as regards them, be defensive.

It is not open to us on the Abor frontier to have recourse to the policy of permanent occupation and direct management, which we so successfully carried out in the Nagas, Joraw, Chingah, Juncash, and Chitragong Hill Tracts. To attack the Abor Hills would be bringing us into contact with tribes still wilder and less known, nor should we find a resting place for the foot of an expedition which we planted it on the plateau of High Asia. And then?

Our immediate border we might do much to secure by running roads along the mountain ridges into the interior, but the cost would be enormous, and while there is such a demand for communications within our settled Districts, we should not be warranted in carrying even one *car-de-sac* into the Abor or Mishmee Hills.

We have seen enough to show that on this frontier our policy has been from the beginning not a policy of coercion and "contumacious devastation," but a firm and kindly policy of defence and conciliation.

It does not form part of our purpose to describe the Saka tribes of Sudda, the Saka-
phos and Khampas, or the part played by them in the history of Assam. They can not
be described as hillmen—their relations with the British Authorities are now a days mainly
social. For similar reasons we pass over altogether the Moansams of Mullai, and other
tribes who dwell in peaceful settlements on the plains.

Turning our steps westward along the northern side of the valley, we came to the
Nagas, the numerous tribes of Nagas who inhabit that great tract of hill-
country extending from longitude 97° east to the Kopili on the west,
including on the south-east and south the whole northern face of the central range
lying between Assam and Barmah, and embracing in its circle North Munipia and
North Cachar.

The Naga tribes living immediately on the borders of the Sibsagar District have been
generally well behaved since they entered into agreements with Captain Brodie in 1841-44.
They frequent the plain markets regularly, and combine to exclude therefrom the Akhar
Nagas of the upper hills. The charms of trade appear indeed to have taken so strong a
hold on the clans in this quarter, that it is almost the only frontier on which the policy
of closing the hills on occasion of a murder or outrage by hillmen is speedily followed by
surrender of the guilty parties. In April 1861 the Dwar were closed to trade by
order of the Commissioner of Assam, in consequence of the murder of one Lachan
Chakram in the Gelaki Dwar. In February following, the Nangots Nagas, who were not
known to us to be the guilty tribe, surrendered five of their number as culprits who had
committed the murder. This, it appeared, they did under pressure brought to bear on
them by the Nagas of Tablong, Jaktong, Kamsang, and Namsang, who being much
distressed by the closing of the Dwar, threatened to attack the Nangots if they did not
give up the offenders. In March 1862 a murder was committed at Muzak, the post
of Sibsagar by Baka Nagas; and at the close of the same month the guard-house on
Golahi Dwar was burnt down by a raiding party belonging apparently to some of the
interior tribes. It was never, however, distinctly brought home to any particular tribe.
The British Governor forbade the closing of the Dwar.

Some alarm was felt at these disturbances on a usually tranquil part of the frontier,
and when in 1866 it was reported that Naga trading parties were wandering about Sibsagar
armed, contrary to custom, with spears and dāos, stringent orders were given for their being
temporarily stopped by the Police at the post. In November 1867, the guard-
house was again attacked at night, and some of the constables killed. This outrage
created much excitement among the European settlers of the neighbourhood, which was
certainly lessened by a subsequent attack upon a village farther off. Every possible motive
was suggested to account for the outbreak. Every known clan was suspected in turn. The
Officer thought the prohibition to carry spears to market had something to do with the matter.
Another was convinced that the encroachments of Tea Planters on the hills were exciting
all the frontier tribes. A third thought the survey operations had excited their suspicion.
The Dwar were at any rate closed to trade, the outposts strengthened, and regular
patrols were kept up. The stoppage of trade again proved a successful policy. The
Tablong, Namsang, and other Nagas who were now carrying on a most profitable trade
with the Tea Gardens, which they could not afford to lose, speedily complied, and no further

months they succeeded in taking out the prisoners, and capturing by force or strategy two of such leaders, who were delivered over to the British Authorities for their due punishment. The men proved to belong to the Yungia Mier Nagas, a separate clan in the upper hills, who are noted for a love of plunder, and a craving for skulls, and had a stealthy war party through trackless jungles to the plains below; and had, as they claim, attacked the Police Post since the autumn that it was a goodly amount of rycots,—a mistake not very creditable to the discipline of the place. Notwithstanding, however, these casual disturbances, we can just say that on the whole, Sibchang has had for many years less trouble from its barbarous neighbours than any other District on this side of Assam.

Each Naga clan near this District has living on the plains one or more Kotekies or representatives, usually Assamese, who enjoy, in virtue of these offices, certain rent-free lands or remission of revenue. If a theft or murder is committed beyond the Naga land, a notice is served on the Kotekies, who communicate with their constituents in the hills, to make the guilty person or persons appear and punished before our District Courts without more ado. These practices seem to be an institution dating back to the time of the Ahom Kings.

When we cross the border to Nowgong, we come upon a very different state of things, and though the last few years have inaugurated an era of happy change, yet still the management of the Angami Nagas is an anxious problem on which much thought has been spent and many official hopes been staked. The country occupied by the Angami Nagas is bounded on the north by the Dhansiri River, on the south by a high range of mountains, forming the boundary of Manipore. The eastern boundary extends as far as Hossang. The limit of the eastern boundary is undefined, but the Doying River on the north east separates the Lota Nagas in Sibchang from the Angamis. — (Butcher). We first visited their country in 1832, when Captains Pemberton and Jenkins endeavoured to open a communication through these hills between Manipore and Assam. They met with a most determined opposition, and had their difficulties to fight their way through to Nowgong. Later on, in the same year, Lord Dalhousie, accompanied by a powerful force under Rajah Gurathoor Sing, captured the strong fort, though the hill, and the Rajah entertained designs of subjugating all the wild tribes between Assam and Manipore, that there might be a free path for commerce from his so-called little kingdom. The attention of the British Government was first directed to the Angami Nagas in 1836, when certain irascible Assam villages in North Cachar were annoyed by a warlike tribe so called living beyond the Dhansiri. So little was known of their position, that the first person we called upon to control them was Tularam Sarapung, who protested loudly that he was more afraid of them than he was. We then applied to Manipore, and the Pany Chakhy of that State were only too ready to execute brilliant little campaigns into the hills, and our villages here, and though, by unfortunately the more the Manipuris attacked the Nagas, the more the Nagas worried North Cachar.

Three times in 1836, again in 1837, and yet again in 1838, the Angamis attacked us. An expedition was at length ordered to enter the hills and stop these raids. But the imminence of war with Burmah caused its postponement, and the only step taken was the transfer of North Cachar to Assam, the local authorities of which province were supposed to be better acquainted with the Nagas than the Superintendent of Cachar.

In January 1839 the Sub-Assistant to the Commissioner, Mr. Grange, led a small force from Nowgong into the Angami hills. The difficulties encountered were such that no attempt at punishing the Naga villages could be made by him, but he managed right through the hills and obtained much correct information as to the habits of the people and their intertribal relations. He ascertained that the communities of Konemah and Mozemah had been the leaders in the late raids. He induced the Chief of Mozemah to meet him, and undertake for himself and Konemah not to molest British territory again. On the whole the result was thought so encouraging, that the local Officers proposed to construct there and then a separate Hill District, to embrace North Cachar and the adjoining tract. The Government, however, thought this too expensive and too risky. The tribes were best, it said, left alone. They should be encouraged to trade, and Mr. Grange might visit their hills again in the cold season of 1839-40: and endeavour to establish order among the clans, and put an end to their internecine feuds. The second Military expedition had a hard time of it. Disappointed of its Manipuri auxiliaries, it was persistently and constantly attacked, and had to read the savages many a severe lesson ere it succeeded in regaining the plains. For some time after this no raids were made. The Nagas for the first time saw that a British force could march through and through their hills in spite of their utmost efforts to prevent it.

In April 1840, a Missionary, the Revd. Mr. Bronson, brought forward a scheme for civilising the Angamis by means of Tea cultivation and Mission Schools, to which he asked Government support. The Government of the day was not well affected to Mission Schools, but it authorized the Governor General's Agent to spend 100 Rupees a month in "furthering objects of practical utility in the Naga country." It would be interesting to see the accounts of this trust. Proposals for constructing a great road across the hills to Manipore were about this time rejected on the score of expense. Lieutenant Biggs, Principal Assistant, was however authorized to enter the hills and make a leisurely and, if possible, friendly progress from village to village, conciliating the Chiefs by personal intercourse and bringing to bear on the people that nameless attraction that the English always think they exercise over less civilized races. In 1841 Lieutenant Biggs carried out his tour. He met with no opposition, and secured friendly agreements with most of the leading communities. A depôt for salt was at their request opened at Dhemapore. The Dhunsiri was fixed as the boundary between the British Districts and the Angami tract. The Government directed that a repetition of these friendly visits should be made from time to time, mainly with a view to the suppression of the slave traffic carried on by the Nagas with the Pangas of Sylhet. The boundary between the Angamis and Manipore was to be settled to prevent irritation on that side, and a road was to be opened to Samongrooting from the plains. A nominal tribute was to be taken from the Nagas as soon as they could be brought to consent to its payment. To arrange the boundary Lieutenant Biggs marched across the hills in the cold weather of 1841-42. It was agreed with the representatives of Manipore that "commencing from the upper part of the Jeric River, the western frontier of Manipore, the line of boundary formed (1) by the Dootighur Mountain, or that range of hills in which the Mookree River takes its rise, east on to the Barak River, (2) by the Barak River up to where it is joined by the Tayphani River, which flows along the eastern line of the Paplongm Hill, (3) by the Tayphani River up to its source on the Bood range of Mountains, and (4) by the summit or waterpart of the Burrai range on to the source of the Mookree River flowing north

a year after this no raid took place, and the Nagas resorted freely to Nowgang to trade. In 1848-49 raiding recommenced, and at last the culminating point was reached in the murder of the Darogah Bhogchand.

This man appears to have had much personal bravery, but little discretion. He had been constantly urging the establishment of advanced posts, and at length he succeeded in getting leave to place a guard in one of the villages that was apprehensive of an attack from a neighbouring community. The policy of meddling in village feuds once inaugurated, Bhogchand must needs go in person to settle a quarrel in Mozemah itself. Brave to rashness he arrested the ringleaders, and was forthwith assailed by both sides. His men fled, leaving him to his fate, and he fell pierced by spears, a victim to his own bold and bold in the prestige of a British Policeman. The Governor General's Agent now reported to Government that if we wished to recover our influence in the hills, we must systematically burn all the granaries and crops to enforce our demands for surrender of offenders. This was the Manipuri plan, and the Nagas thought much better of them than of us. We marched up the hills, and burnt the crops, and marched back again. No one could stand against us, it is true, but we never did much damage, all the same.

An expedition was now despatched to avenge poor Bhogchand's death, and plenary powers of granary burning, in case of armed resistance, were confided to it. In December 1849 it set out, but the Officer in command fell ill. A friendly village which it occupied was burnt while the troops were attacking another not far off, and the detachment had to make a hurried retreat. The Nagas celebrated the occasion by a series of raids all round the border. Indications were not wanting that other tribes were becoming uneasy, and that vague feeling of trouble in the air well known to Frontier Officers began to make itself felt. Manipore was said to be fomenting disturbance by underhand intrigue. Shans of various sorts were said to be busy in the hills. Government, however, was equal to the occasion. A strong force was assembled on the Assam Frontier. The Governor General's Agent was ordered to the spot. The troops were of course absolutely triumphant. They stormed the stockades, burnt the villages, scattered the Nagas like leaves wherever they faced them. And then came the question, what next? What policy was to be adopted towards these mountaineers for the future?

The Supreme Government decided that the policy should be one of absolute non-interference. All troops were to be withdrawn. We were to confine ourselves to our own frontier, to protect it as it could and ought to be protected, never to meddle in the feuds and feuds of savages, to encourage trade with them so long as they were peaceful towards us, and rigidly to exclude them from all communication either to sell or buy on their becoming turbulent or troublesome."

In March 1851 our troops were withdrawn from the hills, and in that year no fewer than 22 Naga raids were reported, in which 55 persons were killed, 10 wounded, and 118 taken captive. It is true only 6 of these raids were traced to Nagas, but they were most of them committed in North Cachar by Naga tribes, who would have been easily controlled by an Officer in the Hills, and any way the policy of non-interference was not very successfully inaugurated.

In 1853 the Government consented to appoint a European Officer to the charge of North Cachar, to protect our villages there from the inroads of the wilder tribes.

In 1854 a Manipore force invaded the Angami Hills, and twenty-two villages sent deputies to beg our interference and protection. The Governor General upon this decided that we were not justified in calling upon Manipore to abstain from working its will among those tribes, as they were not under our protection.

The repeated efforts of the local Officers to induce Government to take once more a direct part in hill management were sternly repressed. The line of outposts which it had been proposed to occupy was contracted. Punitive expeditions for recent outrages were disallowed. Nothing that occurred beyond the outskirts of our inhabited villages was to receive any attention. Dhemapore was abandoned. Borputhar became our most advanced guard. The Officer stationed at North Cachar was strictly charged to look upon the Angamis as persons living beyond the jurisdiction of the British Government. For years raids went on, which our frontier posts proved quite unable to check. North Cachar suffered most from the effects of this policy; where the frontier line was always a matter of doubt, and the presumption was, that any village attacked lay beyond the boundary. In fact at one time it was proposed by the local Officers almost despairingly to abandon North Cachar itself.

At length in 1862 the Commissioner was constrained to say, "It is not creditable to our Government that such atrocities should recur annually with unvarying certainty, and that we should be powerless alike to protect our subjects or to punish the aggressors. It is quite certain that our relations with the Nagas could not possibly be on a worse footing than they are now. The non-interference policy is excellent in theory, but Government will probably be inclined to think that it must be abandoned."

The Lieutenant-Governor, (Sir Cecil Beadon,) who had then succeeded to office, reviewed afresh the whole question of the treatment of these tribes. He dissented from the policy of interdicting them from trade, which had of late years been usual. It was, he said, not only unsound in itself, but it was a policy which, in regard to a country situated as is that of the Angami Nagas, it is impossible to carry out. He directed that an Officer subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner of Nowgong should be placed in immediate communication with the Nagas. The Chiefs on the border were to be informed that Government looked to them to be responsible for the good behaviour of the villages, and annual stipends for this Police duty would be paid to them so long as they performed it well. Written agreements were to be taken to this effect and annual presents interchanged. The Officer to be appointed to this duty was further ordered to decide any disputes voluntarily referred to him, but not to interfere in internal affairs at any rate for the present. Some delay occurred in bringing this policy into actual operation, owing to official changes among the local Officers and the successive representations of conflicting views. There were now the following three distinct lines of policy open, and each had its detractors.

(1.) We might abandon North Cachar and all the hill tracts inhabited by Nagas, and strictly enforce the non-interference policy of 1851. This was Colonel Hopkins's view.

(2.) We might advance into the hills, place special Officers in charge, and maintain them there by force of arms. These were the proposals supported by Colonel Haughton and Major Agnew.

We might, while continuing certain of the plans, cultivate political relations with the neighbouring clans and bring them into stipendiary police relations to ourselves. This was Sir Cecil Beadon's original scheme.

It was unfortunate that at this time the Commissioner of Assam was a somewhat ardent supporter of the first of these courses, and although a more aggressive policy was advocated by the Officers who from time to time acted for him, nothing decisive was done for over two years. Further riots, however, in March and April 1865 forced upon Government a definite settlement of the question. Lieutenant Gregory was at that time in charge of North Cachar, and he reported that unless he were allowed to adopt more vigorous measures than were permitted to his predecessors he could not guarantee the safety of his Sub-Division. Still the Commissioner was for abandoning the whole hill tract to its fate: or at least for closing the Dwaras to all Naga trade. It was necessary now for the Lieutenant-Governor peremptorily to over-rule his representative on the frontier. Sir Cecil Beadon insisted accordingly on a fair trial being given to the policy sketched out by him in 1862; remarking

"If the policy indicated in 1862 had been carried out in the spirit in which it was conceived, there is every reason to suppose these outrages would not have occurred. Two years and a half have been allowed to elapse, and nothing has yet been done to give effect to the orders of Government, and though these orders were peremptorily repeated in a subsequent letter, dated 30th July 1863, they have apparently received from you no answer whatever. The proposal to regulate before these wild tribes and all back from their neighbourhood whenever they choose to annoy us, is one which the Lieutenant-Governor cannot for a moment entertain. The practical effect of such a measure would be that in the course of a few years Assam would be divided amongst the Bhatias, Ahoms, Nagas, Garos, Mishmis, and other wild tribes; for exposed as Assam is on every side, if petty outrages are to be followed by withdrawal of our frontier, we should very speedily find ourselves driven out of the province."

In reply to this the Commissioner entered into an elaborate review of our position in regard to North Cachar and the Nagas, denying that he was himself decidedly averse to taking a more direct control of their country. He, however, pointed out that the democratic nature of the tribal arrangements among the Angamis, the infinite divisions and disputes existing even in a single village, rendered it impossible to hope for success from the policy of conciliation *ad extra* proposed by the Government. He admitted that no system of frontier defence that could be devised would secure perfect immunity from raids. "A country void of roads, void of supplies, a country of interminable hills, of vast swamps covered with dense forest save where here and there a speck in the ocean of wilderness reveals a miserable Meekin or Cachari clearing, cannot possibly be defended at every point against a foe for whom hill and swamp and forest are resources rather than obstacles." From 1854 to 1865 there had been nineteen Angami raids, in which 232 British subjects had been killed, wounded, or carried off. Ninety-two of these unfortunates had been so lost during three years (1854-6) when a chain of outposts was in existence from Berpa har to Assaloo connected by roads which were regularly patrolled. At present we should be able to keep the raid of such savages below a certain maximum, and prevent

their extension to settled districts." The statement of a native Blockhead, the Commission maintained, was advantageous when it could be made practically available, and so far as it was complete. But none of these schemes would secure the peace of the frontier. They had been tried and found wanting. If Government were prepared to consider a more extensive policy he was ready to show how it could best be carried out. This policy had been sketched by Colonel Haughton in 1861 as follows:--He would depute a specially qualified Officer to proceed with a force of not less than 200 men, and erect a permanent station in the country at a point most convenient for keeping open communications and procuring supplies. This Officer would then invite the Chiefs to submit themselves to us. Those who consented would, as a token of submission, pay an annual tribute, and in return receive our aid and protection; while those who refused would be told that we would leave them to themselves so long as they kept the peace towards us and those who submitted themselves to us.

Colonel Hopkins now suggested that Lieutenant Gregory should occupy himself with the way above described. The following was Lieutenant Gregory's own idea of how the operations should be conducted:--

"I am totally averse to any attempt to subdue the country. It could only be done at great expense, and would require a strong force to hold it. It would be further embarking on an unknown sea, for we know nothing of the tribes beyond the Angamis except that they are fierce and warlike; so that it would be well our acquaintance with them should be made gradually and peacefully, which it is most certain would not be the case if we began by annexing the Angami country *et cetera*."

"I would advance step by step, slowly opening out a good road as I went, never getting in advance of the road, and never in advance of ground I was not sure of, until I reached the very centre of the most thickly populated part of the country. There--clear of any village but that of my own hewers of wood and drawers of water, on the slopes of what is described as a most beautiful country, fertile to a degree, finely wooded with oak and laurel, and well watered, I would build the permanent station."

The way in which the Lieutenant-Governor received these proposals will be best seen by the following extract from the letter to the Government of India in regard to them:--

"In regard to the policy to be pursued towards the Angami Nagas, the Lieutenant-Governor is clearly of opinion that the abandonment of the position we held previously to 1861, and the withdrawal of our line of frontier posts to the left bank of the Dhansiri is proved by the events which have since occurred, to have been a grave mistake, and that the only course left us is consistently with the duty we owe to the inhabitants of the adjoining frontier districts as well as to the Angami Nagas themselves, who are torn by intestine quarrels and want of a government, and unable to exercise any general self-control, or to restrain their predatory action on the part of any village or even of a section of any of the numerous villages inhabited by the tribe, is to assert our authority over them, and bring them under a system of administration suited to their circumstances, and gradually to reclaim them from habits of lawlessness to those of order and civilization."

These Angami Nagas are frequently mentioned in the correspondence of late years as independent Nagas, and a distinction is made between the tract they inhabit and British

" affair. Where roads are necessary, they must be constructed in a simple and inexpensive manner, just sufficient for the opening of the country to the extent actually required.

" Should the plan thus sketched succeed, and the hill men be gradually reclaimed to our rule and civilised, without much cost to the British Treasury in the process, it will be a good work well accomplished. But His Excellency in Council cannot admit that we are bound to attempt more in their behalf than the resources of the empire can reasonably afford."

The Secretary of State cordially approved of all that had been done.

It is not necessary to enter into a detailed statement of the mode in which the arrangements thus approved were carried out. Lieutenant Gregory was ordered to establish himself at Samoogoodting. Assaloo, in North Cachar, was abandoned, save by a small Police guard. A road was opened from Dhemapore to the new station. A compact force of 150 Police, all hillmen and well-armed, was placed at Lieutenant Gregory's disposal. Large discretionary powers were entrusted to him of proceeding summarily against villages concerned in any gross outrage, and a rough system of judicial procedure was laid down. The Manipuris were not to be allowed any longer to make retaliatory expeditions into the Naga hills. Measures to redress any outrages committed by Angamis in Manipore were to be taken in concert with Lieutenant Gregory. This was not, of course, to prevent Manipuri troops from following up and punishing any marauding party they fell in with in their own territory. All Angami Nagas visiting the plains of Assam were to be furnished with passes, by Lieutenant Gregory, as they passed through Samoogoodting, where they were also to leave their spears.

As if to give emphasis to the change of policy so happily inaugurated, the Nagas of the village of Razepemah, in January 1866, cut up a Mekir village in North Cachar, and in March Lieutenant Gregory made a dash with a little force of Police and burnt Razepemah to the ground. In June the Razepemah men, to retrieve their honour, made a raid and butchered twenty-six Mekirs in the village of Sergameha,—a practical proof that a policy of coercion does not always succeed. The rains prevented any immediate steps being taken to avenge this outrage. But it was determined that, as soon as Lieutenant Gregory had fairly established himself in the hills, a salutary lesson should be given to the Razepemah community, while an amnesty for the past was extended to all others. This was accordingly done. The village was raised to the ground; its lands declared barren and desolate for ever; and its people, on their making complete submission, were distributed throughout other communities.

Since Lieutenant Gregory took up his position permanently in the hills their history has been uneventful, because it has been perfectly peaceful. The only measure of importance has been the sanction accorded to a proposal of Lieutenant Gregory's to receive at Samoogoodting residuary delegates from the various communities, to whom small stipends will be allowed for acting as interpreters and messengers to their respective Clans.

Before leaving the District of Newgong, we must very briefly mention the other Hill Tracts within its borders. The Rengma Nagas, living in the jungly hills between the Kullianee and the Dhunsiri, were first discovered in 1839, when Mr. Grange came across them on his way to the Angami Hills.

In 1847 a revenue settlement was effected with thirty-two of these villages, and a house tax imposed with the consent of the Chiefs. These Kachari Nagas are fast becoming indistinguishable from the people of the plains. There is nothing remarkable upon their political history.

The Mekirs inhabit the low ranges of hills extending from the Fohmanee on the east to the Jumoona west of Dubhoka. They were originally tributary to the princes of Cachar, Jynteah and Assam. The Assam Rajahs gave them grants of land under the hills. They are, ordinarily, an inoffensive people, paying house tax to the British Authorities of Nowgong and much devoted to the rearing of pigs.

In May 1863 a party of Mekirs, from a village on the confines of Jynteah, attacked another Mekir village at Harlock Parbut and killed some of the inhabitants. When pursued by the Police they resisted. This was just the time of the Jynteah disturbances, and enquiry seemed to show that the Jynteah insurgents had instigated the Mekirs to this attack, to which they were the more predisposed by certain oppressive proceedings on the part of the native Mouzadar. This is the only outrage traceable to Mekirs.

North Cachar has been already incidentally noticed when we were treating of the Angami Nagas, and since its partition among the three Districts of the Naga Hills, Nowgong and Cachar Proper, it has lost that distinctive importance which it once possessed as a frontier district. As originally defined, its boundaries were the River Jumoona and Nowgong on the north, the Burrail Range and Cachar on the south, on the east the Dhunsiri and the Kutcha, and Angami Nagas, and on the west the Kopili and Ompoong rivers, and the Gossyah and Jynteah Hills. In 1839 it was annexed to Nowgong, and in 1852 it was placed in charge of a separate Officer, whose business it was to keep order among the Kookies and Nagas dwelling about Assalpo, and to protect them from the raids of the Angami Nagas. In 1854 Tooleram Senapatty's territory was annexed to North Cachar, the surviving members of the Senapatty's family being pensioned off. The inhabitants of the tract are these:

(1) Hill Cacharies, (2) Hozai Cacharies, (3) Mekirs, (4) Old Kookies, (5) New Kookies, and (6) Arong Nagas; who pay, some a house tax, others a rice tax, and others a general land tax to Government.

The Kookies in North Cachar are all immigrants from the south. The old Kookies say they came north 10 years ago, in the time of Krishen Chandra, Rajah of Cachar. In 1832-3 a body of these Kookies, whom the Cachar Rajah had employed in his contest with Tooleram Senapatty, were found by Colonel Jenkins to have settled in these hills, in a compact well defined community, fearing neither Nagas nor any one else. They were followed from time to time by others. In the years 1851-2 about 8,000 entered the district. This Kookie migration from the south was undoubtedly a sign of movements in the hills towards Burma, of which we know little, but which is still going on. The tribes from the south are still pushing up by slow degrees, and along the border of our Chittagong Hill Tracts a watchful eye can see, every now and then, signs of the changes that are taking place, and which are destined perhaps some day to attract more of our attention than we at present think.

imposed by the Governor General's Agent on all the States that had involved themselves in conflict with the British Government.

As reported by the Agent in 1832, the following was the position held by each of the seven principal Cossyah Chiefs:—

1. Sing Manik of Khyria, the most powerful of the Chiefs, had also been the most friendly. He ruled over seventy villages, had 2000 armed followers and paid a tribute to Government.

2. Within the geographical limits of Khyria lay the villages of Ber Manik, now known as Moleem. This Chief was hostile from the first, and some of his territory was taken over absolutely by Government. He was fined Rupees 5,000, for which he compounded by paying Rupees 1,000 down, and constructing a good road from Cherra via Moleem to Myrang. Ber Manik ruled over twenty-eight villages, had a little army of 400 or 500 men, and paid no regular tribute.

3. Cherra contained twenty-five villages, the population of which could send out 2,000 fighting men. The Rajah had since 1822 been practically subservient to Government, and had given the Syliet Authorities ground for a *Santalpura* at Cherrapouj. He paid no tribute.

4. Onker Sing of Nartang held, besides his hill villages, lands in the Gwalpach, part of which was confiscated for a raid made by him in 1831. Nartang itself was little known in 1832.

5. The Raja Rajah of Nuspang, ruling over twenty-five villages;

6. The Oclat Raja of Murrow, also holding twenty-five;

7. And the Duran Rajah of Merran, holding twenty-four villages, completed the list of leading Cossyah Chiefs as then known to us.

The various States were really little oligarchical republics, each subject, in some ill-defined way, to the control of the rest, and it was matter of doubt whether the Nuaglaw massacre was not partly due to the jealousy of the other Chiefs that Teerut Sing had concluded a Treaty with the British Government for himself, from which they were excluded.

The Cossyah States are now-a-days grouped in two classes:

(1.) The semi-independent, five in number, who have always been friendly or have been actually conquered by a British force;

(2.) The Dependent States, twenty in all, many of them very petty, who are theoretically more subject to the control of the Deputy Commissioner. Practically, however, there is little distinction made in the manner of treating these two classes. The tendency has of late years been to curtail materially the powers of the Chiefs, the people resorting freely to our Courts. There is, however, very little crime of any kind in the Cossyah Hills.

On the conclusion of the war Captain Lister was (in February 1835) appointed Political Agent of the Cossyah Hills, with the charge of our relations with the Synteah Rajah. These relations were, however, destined to undergo a very speedy change, for in March of the same year the plains of Synteah were annexed to the British territories, and

Hills by the British Government. From 1835 to 1849, the Sintengs, as the Jynteahs are called, were left almost entirely to their own devices. The Dolloies heard all civil cases, first without exception, and after 1844 no to a certain limit, and all criminal complaints not of a heinous character in which any people of their own villages were concerned. Their administration was, however, flagranty corrupt, and they managed to secure for themselves most of the Raj lands of which no accurate accounts had been taken by Government. No taxes of any kind were imposed by us in the Jynteah Hills for many years. The tribute of he-goats continued to be annually paid, and in 1853 credit was given to the Officers at Chierra for effecting a slightly more favorable sale of these offerings than had been usual theretofore. In that year Mr. Mills, who had been deputed to enquire into certain abuses in the Cossyah Hills' judicial administration, drew attention to the state of the Jynteah Hills. He pointed out that in 1849 Colonel Lister had suggested the imposition of a house-tax "in consequence of the disposition evinced by some of the people to assert their independence." This had, however, been negatived by Government. Mr. Mills strongly urged that the error should be repaired, and a more intimate knowledge of the people acquired by the English Officers. He also advocated the establishment of a Police Thannah to check the lawless proceedings of the Dolloies. Lord Dalhousie quite concurred in these views. In neighbouring Hill Tracts house-tax was paid, and we were acting unwisely and inequitably in exempting Jynteah. The Agent was directed to proceed into the Jynteah Hills and prepare a full report on Revenue, Civil, and Criminal Justice, and all other matters connected with the Jynteah Territory. A thannah was established at Jowai. But not much else was actually at this time carried out, so far as we can discover.

In 1858 Mr. Allen submitted another elaborate report upon the Cossyah and Jynteah Hills. After the fullest consideration he came to the conclusion that the Sintengs should be required to contribute something in acknowledgment of the supremacy of the Government. He said: "I am of opinion that a light and judicious taxation would contribute to the preservation of tranquillity and good order in the Jynteah Hills. A moderate taxation had a very beneficial effect upon the savagery of the Lorika Coles of the Singbbhoon district of the south-west frontier agency. It was found to make them less turbulent and aggressive, and more thrifty, diligent, and submissive to the authorities; and I am disposed to think that a very moderate taxation, fixed for a term of years, would improve the condition and strengthen the peaceful and industrious inclinations of these wild mountaineers also." He proposed a moderate house tax, to be collected through the village authorities. Proposals were also suggested into the condition of the Raj lands, and the allotment of waste to European settlers was discussed. But Mr. Allen insisted strongly on the necessity of stationing a European Civil Officer in the centre of the tract to administer justice to the people, and be to them a visible representative of that Government of which they knew almost nothing. Unfortunately, the proposal to levy a house-tax was adopted, while the Sintengs were left as before to the management of their Dolloies.

In 1860 the house tax was imposed, and, within a few months, the people were in open rebellion. Fortunately, a large force of troops was close at hand and before the rebels could make any head, it was stamped out, and the villages were again apparently subsided. It was supposed at the time that the ex-Jynteah had been in some way mixed up with the movement in the hills, but to this idea little weight should be attached. For two and twenty

years the Sontengs had been content to pay their tribute of he-goats to the British Officers. They never respected the Rajah while he did rule over them; and they had openly affronted his family more than once since his abdication. On the suppression of this partial rising measures were taken for the improvement of the administration. The Civil Officer at Cherra was empowered to remove the Dehqans for misconduct, while at the same time the powers of those functionaries were increased. All crimes were to be reported by them to the Police, who were not, however, to interfere vexatiously in village affairs.

Scarcely had the agitation of this disturbance had time to settle, when the necessities of Imperial Finance imposed the income tax throughout British India. The local Officers applied to Government to know whether this new impost was to be levied in the Cossyah and Jynteeah Hills; and if the last named tract was to be affected by it, whether the house-tax was also to be maintained. It was ruled that the house tax was not to be given up on account of the income tax, the incidence of the two being not the same, and that the income tax "was to be introduced only in those parts of the hills where taxes had been previously levied, *i. e.*, in the Jynteeah Territory, and those other villages near the station of Cherrapoonjee which belong to the British Government." It seems to have been the belief at Calcutta that, practically, the tax would be inoperative in the hills. Fortunately, the whole of the Cossyah States escaped it, and the loyalty of the Chiefs was not tried by this severe and practical test.

In the Jynteeah Hills 310 persons were taxed, on whom the whole amount assessed was Rupees 1,259. The highest rate levied and that only in one case, was Rupees 9. One person paid Rupees 5. Twenty-seven paid Rupees 4-8 each; and the rest were taxed the minimum amount, Rupees 4 each per annum. The tax for 1860-61 was paid without a murmur. The Deputy Commissioner travelled through the hills in 1860-61, and again in November 1861 without detecting a sign of disaffection. But the material was all there. The mass of the people had been subjected to the house tax in 1860. The leaders were further brought under the income tax in 1861. There were rumours of pan and trade taxes in the air. What spark actually began the conflagration it is hard to tell. Whether it was the rash talk of some bullying Policeman, or an injudiciously executed order against the use of arms, we do not clearly know. The small number of troops then available gave an opportunity which had been wanting in 1860; and on the 20th of January 1862 the Sontengs rose in fierce rebellion. "A people who had neither been left to their own guidance, nor regularly brought under our rule; upon whom our yoke had pressed with just sufficient force to gild, but not to break into order; who had been denied the boon of having our rule represented among them by an English Officer, and of all our institutions, who had known only our system of Police as illustrated by a thannah on the Bengali model, and our latest experiments in taxation: who, just after they had been taught the lesson that they could only be compelled to pay an obnoxious tax by the application of Military force, &c. straightway rebelled, the means of compulsion being at the same time withdrawn, when such a people rise in rebellion (said the Commissioner *ex-post-facto*) it may not be difficult to explain its origin and object, without searching after remote causes."

Into the history and progress of the rebellion we have no need to enter. Crushed apparently in four months after its outbreak, it again almost immediately burst out afresh,

and it was not till November 1863, when every glen and jungle had been searched out by our Troops and Police, that the last of the rebel leaders surrendered, and the pacification of Jynteah could be said to be complete.

The general line which the policy of Government was now to take in regard to the Santals was thus laid down.

"A main principle to be adopted in dealing with these people, when they have been made to understand and feel the power of the Government, and have submitted to its authority, is not to leave them in their old state, but, while adopting a simple plan of Government suitable to their present condition and circumstances, and interfering as little as possible with existing institutions, to extend our intercourse with them, and endeavor to introduce among them civilization and order."

An English Officer, with full powers, was accordingly posted to the Jynteah Hills, where he was personally to reside. He was to visit every village in his jurisdiction at least once a year, and, with his subordinates, was to be required to qualify in the Cossyah language sufficiently to dispense with all interpreters. The village Dolloies were to be chosen by the people, subject to the Civil Officer's approval, and to hold office during good behaviour. With other village Officers they were to form panchayets, by whom specified civil and criminal powers were to be exercised, subject to the revision of the British Officer in important or heinous cases. The Dolloies and Sirdars were to be responsible for the Police of their respective jurisdictions, and the Regular Police were only to interfere to repress disturbance or support the authority of the Dolloies. Proceedings were to be *viva voce* as far as possible. Education was to be liberally encouraged: the Wesleyan Mission already established in the hills being made the instrument of its extension. The country was to be thoroughly opened up by eight lines of road, aggregating in length 218 miles. The income tax had been virtually withdrawn by the Act repealing it on all incomes below Rupees 500 a year. The house tax was of course to be retained, due care being taken that no inequality or injustice was allowed in its assessment.

On these general principles the administration of the Jynteah Hills has been reformed, and the policy of direct management, by resident European Officers, has, here, as in the Nag Hills, proved successful. Cossyah and Jynteah are probably now the most secure of all our Hill Districts.

West of the Cossyah are the Garrow Hills. There appears, however, to be little or no intercourse between their inhabitants. Our communications with the Garrows have been entirely from the sides of Chittagong and Mymensing, and they are the first of the Assam mountain tribes with whom we came in contact. Our knowledge of them dates from our occupation of Rungpore and Mymensing.

The chief earlier sources of authentic information in regard to the Garrow Hill are—

- (1) A paper by Mr. Elliot in the 3rd Volume of the Asiatic Researches.
- (2) Reports on the Baidari duties of Sherpoe and Shooming by the same gentleman, dated 1789.

- (2) An account by Dr. Buchanan, the substance of which appears in Volume 8 of Martin's Eastern India.
- (11) A Report by Mr. Siskin in 1815.
- (13) A Report by Mr. Scott in 1816.

Under the Moguls the whole of the north-east part of Bengal were divided into great estates, held for the most part by their original owners, who, while paying a small tribute to the Muhammadan Foujdar of Rungamatty as acknowledgment of fealty, were, to all intents and purposes, independent. They were bound, in fact, merely to supply a certain number of elephants, or a small quantity of aghur, a precious wood, to support certain petty garrisons, and to contribute to the maintenance of the Dacca Artillery Park. Their estates were never subjected to a land revenue assessment. They paid what they did pay from 'Sayer' and not from 'Mal.' The Foujdar generally made advances on account of cotton to these great Choudries, as the Zemindars were called, and received from them yearly consignments of that article; but as no account was ever taken of the Foujdar's collections so long as he paid the stipulated assignment at Dacca, these transactions were carried on solely for the benefit of himself and the Choudries.

The Choudries of Kurribari, Kaldoolahpara, and Meeaspura, (or Meechpara in that part of Rungpore now called Gawalparah), were the chief landholders of this kind at the time of our accession to the Dewani. They held all the low country under the Garrow Hills on that side, and it was their principal duty to repress the incursions of the savage tribes of the uplands, who even then were a source of terror to the cultivation of the plain. As all the cotton, the staple of the internal eastern trade, came from these hills, the Choudries had established at all the principal passes hats or markets guarded by their Burmandazes, to which the low country merchants, with their permission, resorted; and at which they extorted from merchants and Garrows, alike, dues either in kind or cash, which formed one of the main sources of their income. It would appear that at this early period the Choudries had not attempted to secure any footing in the hills, save perhaps on those outlying and lower spurs which intersected their own estates.

After our accession to the Dewani, things continued in this neighborhood on much the same footing as before. A Sezawal was annually appointed, who contracted to pay the Government demand, making his own arrangement with the Choudries. This left them as independent as before, and up to the year 1191 (B. S.) i. e., A. D. 1787-88, we find that their revenue was always paid in cotton.

In 1182-83 (1775-76) the Choudries of Meeaspura and Kurribari, to avenge some Garrow raids more than usual severity, invaded the hills bordering on their respective estates and entered on a career of conquest. They remained two or three years in the hills, and brought the tribes of a large tract entirely under their control. The great chief of the southern part of the hills (Benghata) became in course of time subject to Kurribari. This brought the Choudrie of Kurribari into conflict with the Choudrie of Sherepore, in Mymensing, for Benghata's people had been in the habit of trading at the hats of Sherepore and Shoosung. The Zemindar of Kurribari, Mohendronarain Choudrie, was not the man to brook Sherepore interference. He built forts in the passes, on the Mymensing side, to stop

The Garrow trade and the Garrows had been in the hands of the Rungpore Choudries. Mr. Elliot, who was at that time in the hill country, got Renghta released, and he and all his people offered to become Zemindars, provided they were protected from the Kurribari Zemindari. He himself was convinced of the great trade advantages promised by such an arrangement, and he reported that the Kurribari Zemindars had accepted the proposal. The Commissioner of Cooh Behar reported that the Kurribari Zemindars had no rights in the hills save those he maintained by force. The Government accordingly directed that Renghta should be made a Zemindar under the Company, and the Kurribari Choudrie should be forbidden to molest him, but he offered a remission of revenue should he be unable, in consequence, to pay the Government. This interference in the negotiation fell through, owing to the unfairness of the Kurribari Choudries, who simply arrested the messengers sent to Renghta to conclude the arrangements. He then closed all the passes leading to Mymensing and defied the Company's authority. He even invaded Sherepore itself. All attempts at the time to define the Kurribari Zemindari were defeated by him. At last it was done by the Board's order, and the revenue, but the auction purchaser was ruined in the attempt to get possession. Renghta then threw himself into the hills, and set up a lakheraj claim to the greater part of his territory. It was some years before the Government succeeded in arresting him. The result was that the Garrows had no purchase of land, and nothing to do with it.

Meanwhile the Garrows had not ceased to make incursions into the plain, and to oppress themselves on the Rungpore Choudries for the extortion of land and money. In 1816, after a particularly atrocious raid, Mr. Elliot, who was then in the hill country, sent the following account of the Garrows at the time of his visit:

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Kulobhatlopar had been in a bad head. The Garrows on its borders were independent, though some paid a nominal cotton tribute.

3. The Mechpura Choudrie had in 1776-7 effected large conquests, but was afterwards defeated by a minor, and now only a few outlying Garrow villages, and the plain remained in the possession of ordinary ryots' villages, and in these the Garrows were not allowed to carry on their trade. In the Hill Tracts the Garrows were not allowed to carry on their trade, and were not allowed to carry on their trade.

4. Hubrayhat. Here the Garrows on the first ranges had been reduced to unconditional submission, but had been liberally treated, and were not allowed to carry on their trade. Jagirdars, charged with the defence of the passes against the Garrows, were quite under the Regulations of Government.

They would not be injured nor detained. In December 1852 the party I have been mentioning, accompanied by Subpostul Singh and some of his followers, who said that he and his brother Guehy, Chief, are wished to be friends with us, and he, after a few days' residence at ... returned to his own country and ... the ... of permanent ... have been constantly in the habit of coming down towards the ... country for the purpose of ... and I trust nothing will occur to disturb the friendly intercourse which now exists.

Towards the south, in order to protect the inhabitants from any aggressions of

foreign Kookies or others, there are at present three out-posts furnished by the Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion at ... Jafferband, and Soonabaree of the ... in the margin, and ... at ...

Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion

	1852	1853	1854	1855
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There is the Chatter River, besides which there is a small ... of ... the ... peoples.

There are no ... at the present time to the ... and ... have been ... and ... some ... that are to be found among the records of the ...

In September 1834, a party of wood-cutters had ... by a party of Kookies, and most of them barbarously killed. The Magistrate of Sylhet, under instructions from the Court of Circuit, called upon the "Rajah of Tipperah" to exert himself to ascertain and arrest the offenders. The Magistrate remarked however: "The Rajah, I know, claims authority as paramount lord or superior over all the Kookies to the eastward, but this authority is entirely nominal over those tribes who are beyond his capital." Many attempts have been made by the Rajah to establish his authority in some manner, particularly among the Tarhans and Pyto Kookies, without success. The range of hills ... is the ... inhabited by the Pyto Kookies. Three spies or messengers sent by the Rajah ... the hills reported that the ... had been committed by the ... The ... was ... by the ... The ... Kookies had ... the ... on the ... and directed the ... from the ... An expedition was ... but it does not appear that it was ... and the matter was ...

The next serious ... was in May 1851, and this also took place in Sylhet & Moulmein ... Koochun, Dagonah, ...

It has been thought best ... particular period under notice.

...light and the bodies were exposed off, with six the corpses. The vander... he under the leadership of Lal Chokla, son of the Rajah, nephew of... of importance in the hills. There had been some trouble before... was supposed to be buried with his murdered body. The Rajah of... called upon to help in recovering the corpses. The Magistrate said... ability of the Rajah to control his subjects, and as a result the life and property of the Company's subjects are by that time being exposed to such dangers. In reply the Government requested the Administration the propriety of not relying wholly upon anything the Rajah could do to recover the corpses. A panic was caused by this raid along the border, and a Government Khas estate was being fast deserted by its ryots, when a body of Sylhet Infantry was by the Magistrate ordered to the front. Government, however, thought a Police patrol would be more likely to secure the frontier, and directed the withdrawal of the troops.

The reply of the Tipperah Rajah to the call made upon him for cooperation was very unsatisfactory. He said he had deputed a *Darogah* and... to discover... the murders, in itself an obvious farce. But he added that the land on which Kochobari stood was his, and had been taken away from him—a remark which led to a suspicion, that he was not altogether to be relied on. Fortunately, however, the Rajah's *zaminदार* in the District of Tipperah was... under the management of Mr. J. P. Wise, to whom the local authorities applied to influence the Rajah. Mr. Wise pledged himself to have the murderers delivered over, dead or alive. Dec. 1844. From his letter it appeared that Lal Chokla had applied to the Rajah to get him out of the scrape, a clear indication that there was some relation subsisting between them. Lal Chokla was reported to be Chief of 4,000 Kookie ryots, and to possess 100 muskets. Mr. Wise said, the raid was, he believed, only a pretext for a quarrel with Lard, but to an unfair hearing of Lard's side of the quarrel. Lard, however, followed the Rajah to the 1st December to fulfil the promise of arresting the murderers. He was informed that should he fail to do so by that date, troops would enter the hills and attack Lal Chokla's villages, while the Rajah would be held responsible for securing the pass and preventing that Chief's escape into the unknown tracts beyond. In November the Rajah sent in to Sylhet four defendants and twenty-seven witnesses as concerned in the Kochobari raid. These had apparently confessed to the crime before the Rajah, but one and all, witnesses included, denied all knowledge of the crime before the... of the Rajah.

On the 1st December, as Lal Chokla had not been given up, a party of troops, under Captain Blackwood, entered the hills at Koi... The Rajah's native servants and troops... but Mr. Wise's Assistant, Mr. Watt, did what he could for... and... Chief, Lal Mee Sing, also attended them. Captain Blackwood's men surrounded Lal Chokla's village, and removing all the stored grain they could find in the country round about reduced the... to speedy submission. On the evening of the 15th, Lal Chokla surrendered. He confessed freely that he had despatched the

During the year 1896 the British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments.

There have been many reports of the Chinese Government's efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments.

It is a matter of fact that the Chinese Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments.

It does not enter into the plan of this memorandum to discuss the British relations with the Chinese Government. However, it is necessary to state that the British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments.

Again in 1896, a band of 1000 Chinese troops, under the command of General Chang, were sent to the border between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments. The British Government has been very active in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the boundary question between the British and the Chinese Governments.

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At first it seemed as if the negotiations with these hostile chiefs would be successful, and they were permitted to close, and it was expected to them to get supplies from the United States. They have apparently no communication with anyone.

The position of a good crop, however, rendered their intention not feasible, and in September 1862 they sent to say that though they had no intention of attacking the army, they considered they had a right to cut up other tribes. They demanded the Cheyennes, Arapahoes and M'gicks, and we had no right to take them. They said they would not be moved from their land, and that sort of thing would not do. On the 10th of October they sent to say that they would lay waste the country. To a further message they replied that we must be content with their promise not to attack us, but that they would come on to see the Superintendent.

On the 20th January 1863, Mr Cecil Beadon took up the question of our frontier policy in this quarter, in the same spirit in which he had approached it elsewhere. It was said:

"This correspondence has convinced His Honor that our policy with the hostile tribes in the frontier is carried out upon a wrong principle, and that as long as our policy rests upon this assumption, that the leaders of hostile tribes cannot be trusted until they have been made to feel our power, we shall be in danger of continuing ourselves with them in another unsatisfactory and profitless contest.

"Every endeavor should be made to induce the Chiefs of the unfriendly tribes not to come in, as it is called, that is, to present themselves before the Superintendent, either at Fort Collins or some other place at a distance from the frontier, but to consent that he should meet them at some spot equally convenient to both parties, and then to enter into written engagements for the future maintenance of peace on the border.

"If a meeting of this kind could be arranged in such a manner as not to wound the natural savage pride of these Chieftains and their followers, and if they could once be made to feel confidence in our pacific intentions, the Government's objective has no doubt been attained. They would willingly enter into any reasonable engagements we might demand, that all hostile intentions and the apprehensions on of these would cease, and that the tribes instead of being a source of trouble to those who live under our protection would become a source of strength.

"One of the best means of conciliating the good will of tribes, like the Comanches, is to arrange an annual gathering of Chiefs at some convenient place in the hills, at which the Superintendent, representing the British Government, should receive and give gifts to each Chief, and bestow on him a present of a medal, and should also receive, of hearing and redressing all complaints and grievances, and of encouraging friendly communication between the different tribes, and between these and the people of the plains. To attend at such meetings, and to receive a token of friendly disposition from the Superintendent, would soon come to be regarded as a privilege, and the general good will of the tribes would be cultivated again in proportion to the who held aloof.

A good Police allowance, either in money or in kind, might be given to each Chief to enable him to keep the peace within his own tribe, and to prevent his people from attacking the neighbors, and this would also serve as a security for his own tribe, and the peace.

"To enable you to see what may be effected by a policy of this kind, I am desirous to forward to you the accompanying copy of a Report on the subject of the Commission of the Lushai Range, detailing his observations with the Lushais and the progress of a long time given us since the date of that Report, and of the engagements which have been entered into with them. The Lieutenant-Governor desires that the policy which has been adopted in the case of the Lushais may be followed out in respect to the tribes on the frontier of the Lushai Range. If this be done, it will most probably remove all ground of complaint on the part of the Lushais, and the means at your disposal for coercing these people, and the cost of subsidizing them, and making them amenable to their own Police, will be far more than covered by the restriction which will be imposed on the Military and Police Establishments."

In accordance with these instructions, Captain Graham, the Superintendent of Hill Tracts, proceeded to Rutton Poa's village, and that Chief with nine other leading Chiefs of the Lushai Range, entered into binding engagements to keep the peace. Messengers sent thence to the Commissioner brought back a document signed by their principal Chiefs (now called Vanoah), his brother "Savah," and three other Chiefs, in which they agreed to keep quiet and to meet the Superintendent at Kassalong in January. Vanoah sent in an elephant's tusk in token of amity. Vanoah, one of the Sylo Chiefs, also offered friendly presents. It was found that many British subjects were held captive by the Howlongs, and the Lieutenant-Governor directed that no payments of tribute should be made to any tribe so long as it retained such captives. The agreement signed by Rutton Poa and others is reproduced in a later note.*

The following payments, having been made in kind, were sanctioned:—

Rutton Poa's tribe	Rs. 100
Sylo Kookies (if they agreed to terms)	500
Howlongs	500

At the close of 1863, the Commissioner had a very satisfactory interview with most of these Chiefs at Kassalong, when presents were interchanged and feasts given.

In February 1864 an attack was made upon the Poang's country by armed Kookies. Rutton Poa had previously sent in to warn our post at Kassalong, that a band of Banjogi Kookies had passed southward. This seemed to be the same band. The attack was beyond our posts. The party passed away and nothing more seems to have been heard of them.

*The Kookies hereby acknowledge all persons of the following descriptions living in the hills and valleys of the Lushai Range, namely:—Mingha, Ban, and Tippeh, and all other tribes in the Lushai Range, to be under the protection of the British Government.

The Kookies engage to pay tribute to the British Government, and to be subject to the British Police, and to be subject to the British Government in all respects.

The British Government engage to protect the Kookies from all attacks, and to pay them tribute.

The British Government engage to pay tribute to the Kookies, and to be subject to the British Police, and to be subject to the British Government in all respects.

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The Superintendent should be desired to make every endeavour to ascertain the tribe to which the people concerned in the case at Yong Theng Kooan's village belong, the place whence they came, and the route they followed both in coming and going. It is quite clear to the Lieutenant Governor that they must have crossed over the boundary ridge dividing the district of the Shindoes from those of the Surgeo, and that it is only by the action of the Akas and others that they can be effectually reached.

The Chief Commissioner of British Burma will be asked to take such action as he may think proper and expedient, with a view to the punishment of the offenders and the rescue of the captives, and the Superintendent of the Hill Tracts should be desired to co-operate for this purpose with the officers of the Akyab District in any measures that may be taken under the direction of the Chief Commissioner.

It seems to the Lieutenant Governor to be established by the correspondence in this case that under the existing circumstances of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the officer, who superintends the civil administration of the District, ought himself to have direct charge of the police, and that the present arrangement under which the police of the Chittagong District and of the Hill Tracts is under one District Superintendent of Police subordinate to the Magistrate of Chittagong and to the Civil Superintendent of the Hill Tracts is undesirable. His Honor is, therefore, inclined to think that the best plan would be to appoint an officer to be in charge of the Hill Tracts with full administrative and police powers, his headquarters at Chundergon, and with an Assistant exercising similar powers at some convenient and suitable spot on the Surgeo, more accessible to the hillmen than the sub-divisional headquarters at Cox's Bazar.

These proposals were approved by the Government of India.

The Chief Commissioner of British Burma, however, reported that nothing could be accomplished in the present season to reach the Shindoes, and indeed he deprecated any hostile action at a period when in our present ignorance of their country, but stated that he had recommended the appointment of a Superintendent of Hill Tracts and the establishment of a Police Post.

The following extracts from a letter from the Government of India will show what the authorities of British Burma know of the Shindoes and other tribes:—

The subject of our relations with the various hill tribes inhabiting the country on the north and north-east of British Burma, the District of Akyab, has for years been one of great difficulty. Those tribes are very numerous. Though they are found in the same general social condition, and all apparently of the Indo-Chinese race, their languages are so different that they can only communicate with each other by means of a foreign tongue. The one used for this purpose is Burmese, which a few of the men in each tribe generally understand. They, for the most part, are in a state of constant warfare. A very considerable portion of the Akyab District is inhabited by these tribes. The principal are the Khyangs, Koomes, Kamees, Khons, and Shindoes. There are others, as Myoos, Mroongs, and Khyans, which have not lost their former position and power, so entirely that they may be disregarded.

Of the Khyangs, Koomes, and Kamees, some clans or communities who live in the lower hills are in every respect subject to British rule. Others, though within the nominal boundary of the Akyab District, are practically independent. Among these latter are the Shindoes, regarding whom I have now more particularly to speak.



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should be made to open negotiations with the Chiefs of the Howlongs and to settle with them the causes of the present movement, to settle any disputes which may be between them and the British Government, the Hill Tracts, and to induce them to enter into engagements such as that already made with Rutton Poca, for assisting our Police in keeping order and preventing the recurrence of these attacks. Every encouragement should at the same time be given to the Chiefs in the Hill Tracts to adhere to their engagements, and to encourage them to Police in repelling these attacks and pursuing the security of the hills.

The early part of 1867 was very much disturbed by raids and rumours of raids. Towards the close of January a marauding party appeared between the posts of Chima and Kholong, and cut up several villages, retiring as usual before they could be got at by the Police. The Sumbloong Valley was the point on which the Howlongs generally at this time advanced—and in February Rutton Poca warned us again that a war party was out in that direction. Our posts were at once strengthened and patrols thrown out. No attack followed on our villages, but the Kholongs passed on and attacked the Shindoes of Arracan. A band of 500 Howlongs was about this time induced by Rutton Poca to turn back when en route for British territory, and to divert their attack to Hill Tipperah. For this service Rutton Poca received Rupees 500 reward. The raid on Hill Tipperah was also frustrated; it is not very clear how.

In March 1867, Captain Bowie, the Officer who had been specially ordered to report upon the Police of the Hill Tracts, submitted the result of his investigations. He proposed to throw back to the eastward the line of posts for the purpose of covering the Sumbloong and Sumbloong Valley—to mass the force in three main posts of fifty men each with connecting posts of twenty men each; a reserve of 100 men being stationed at the Deputy Commissioner's Head-Quarters—that a road traversable for elephants should be made from post to post along the whole line;—and that various subsidiary arrangements, calculated to improve the efficiency of the force, should be carried out. These suggestions were generally adopted. Myanmee, Kassalong, and Kungo Yung were made the principal stations, while the intermediate outposts were placed at Kurkuria, Saichul, Pharoo, Phundoo, and Chima. Besides these, there were Executive Police posts at Runglar, Manecirai, Goussar, Ramgama, and Pola Khe. If the names above given are traced out on the map, a good idea will be formed of our scheme of frontier defence. The line of posts does not go further south than the Arakan Hill Tracts are now under a British Officer whose duty it is to prevent incursions into that district.

In December 1867 the friendly Chiefs of the Rutton Poca clan held their Annual Meeting with the Deputy Commissioner at Kassalong. This was a most successful gathering. Seventeen Chiefs and Deputies attended, and what was more encouraging, both the Howlongs and Kholongs sent in before the Meeting to make offers of friendship and alliance to the British Government. After the Meeting, Captain Lewin set out for Rutton Poca's village to meet the Howlongs. Arriving there, he succeeded, after some negotiation, in concluding a treaty of friendship, which was ratified by sacrifice and feasting, and in which twenty Chiefs or their representatives joined: lump sums of money were given as presents to the Chief, and it was settled that these should be in lieu of all annual payments hitherto

February 1869, the British sent a detachment of 100 men to the post of
and entered into similar arrangements. I have already seen the consequences of such
near the borders of the hill and the long hill, which is a great number of miles from
from which we can see the hills, the day of the British was a day of great
Canton, now a small town, but the British had a large number of men and
order and discipline as in the Howlong case. The Lieutenant Governor, who had
had been done, and directed the establishment of an annual fair, to which all
should be freely invited to come.

The close of January 1869 was marked by a series of raids and a small battle at
the post, in which the Shindoes* are supposed to have been defeated. The
has not yet been received, but the Hill Police has been materially increased.

A careful consideration of the few preceding pages seems to lead to the following
conclusions:—The peace of our Hill Tracts depends mainly upon our relations with the
Shindoes in the south-east and south, and with the Lushais in the north. Of the Shindoes
we know very little, and it seems to fall to the lot of the Officer in charge of the Hill Tracts
of Arracan to deal with them rather than to us. Pending an improvement in our commu-
nications with and influence over this tribe, our only resource appears to be to increase the
number of our Police posts in that part of the hills, and to see that a clear communication
is kept open between them. Something, too, might be done, as has often been
suggested to encourage a system of self-defence among the villages of the Lushais and
others who cultivate the upland.

But the question of most interest and importance to us is the one which
relates to our northern boundary. The regulation districts of the Agency and Tipperah
are then open to attack. Tipperah we have once seen devastated by a band of
and in Chittagong Kooki parties are of yearly occurrence. The people are
more loudly for soldiers, when we remember that precisely the same circumstances
themselves on the north of the Lushai country, where Sylhet and Caenar are exposed
to the ravages of the same tribe under different leaders. In the year 1868 we saw
the Native State of Tipperah by its weakness, misgovernment, and internal
attack and endangering the safety of our neighbouring districts. Of what was
Hill Tipperah we have no cognizance. Vague rumours reach us from time to time
raids on the Rajah's villages by the wild Kookies, and of raids on the Kooki Tribes by the
Rajah's people. But it is only when our frontier line is crossed by a band of
war party of savages in hot pursuit, or when villages, the position of which is
doubtful, are burnt and plundered, that we awake to the fact that the Hill State is a
danger to us, and find that we are powerless to protect our subjects or arrest the
danger.

Only last year there was an instance of the unsatisfactory state in which
in the hills reach our ears. In February 1868 a party of armed men passed one of our
Sylhet guard posts, were stopped and put to flight. They were then seen to be
Rajah's sepoy going to reinforce one of his guard posts. Kooki are said to have
attached by a band of savages and members of the Kooki Tribes, who are
the hills of the Lushai country, and the Kooki Tribes are said to be
hills. The thing is so, nothing definite was ascertained, but it is clear we have
Kookies attacking villages in Sylhet and tea gardens in Chittagong.

* Further information makes this point doubtful.

It is very clear that the Government has been very much annoyed by the late demand of rent, and the manner in which the Rajah has set about the collection of it, viz., at the point of the bayonet, is the real, and, I believe, the only reason for the combination among the Tipperahs, and the threatening of the Government.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst., and to inform you that the Rajah has been told that the Government has been very much annoyed by the late demand of rent, and the manner in which the Rajah has set about the collection of it, viz., at the point of the bayonet, is the real, and, I believe, the only reason for the combination among the Tipperahs, and the threatening of the Government.

The Rajah, while in the capital, has been very much annoyed by the late demand of rent, and the manner in which the Rajah has set about the collection of it, viz., at the point of the bayonet, is the real, and, I believe, the only reason for the combination among the Tipperahs, and the threatening of the Government.

The late demand of rent, and the manner in which the Rajah has set about the collection of it, viz., at the point of the bayonet, is the real, and, I believe, the only reason for the combination among the Tipperahs, and the threatening of the Government.

The persons sent out by the Rajah to collect rent were armed like the Tipperahs (with our own bayonets and bayonets supplied by Government two years ago), as a natural consequence of sending out a number of armed ruffians under no command or discipline whatever, an affray very soon occurred in which three of the Rajah's men were wounded by spears, and two of the Jametyas were killed, the heads of these were cut off, and are now hanging up at Agartallah.

Of course these murders, for I can call them nothing else, since the Rajah's people appear to have been the aggressors, have very much irritated the Tipperahs.

I am convinced that neither Neelkishen nor Raja Phakoor have had any hand in this rising. The Rajah's conduct in sending out a number of armed ruffians to collect rent, and afterwards cutting off and hanging up the heads of the murdered men, instead of issuing a strict and dispassionate enquiry into the merits of the affray, were quite sufficient to account for the disturbances in the first instance, and the after show of hostility and combination against him, without any connivance or assistance on the part of his brothers, however hostile their own feelings might be.

Judging from the facts of the case, and the general tenor of the petition in which mention of the collection of rents is most disingenuously omitted, it appears to me that the Rajah has written to you with the sole object of throwing all the blame and responsibility of the disturbance on his brothers, fearful of the censure and displeasure of Government should the true state of matters come to the knowledge of the authorities.

It is very clear that the Rajah has been very much annoyed by the late demand of rent, and the manner in which the Rajah has set about the collection of it, viz., at the point of the bayonet, is the real, and, I believe, the only reason for the combination among the Tipperahs, and the threatening of the Government.

In reporting the facts of the case to the Government, I would respectfully submit that the first step should be to send a commission to investigate the facts of the case, and to report to the Government.

...and trade, and I go to the Sadras and to the Angami and Mising, representing the
civilization on which their crest is due to be abolished, and which we must have
most, rather to destroy it.

The history of our intercourse with the Angamis and Gacharis is a history of
repeated outrage on the one side, and long suffering and forbearance on the other. Since the
of the Naga frontier to an independent Native Government, unable to protect its subjects
without to force its claims, it was the duty of time to continue the negotiation
and the murder of a British subject was more to the British Government. The murder
—the blood of a Cachari swineherd, a thing that cried for vengeance. It was on
the most troublous days of our relations with the Nagas, did the Government, directly,
or even indirectly, set before it a policy of reprisal. The ever reiterated command to
frontier Officers and Commandants was this:—"Conciliate if you can, but do not
persistent in demanding surrender of murderers, but endeavour so to approach the matter
that a basis may be opened for friendly intercourse in the future." The policy of
so-called military expeditions into the Angami Hills were designed, not to burn villages,
destroy crops, and slay men, but to bring our Officers with safety into and to a
position in which they could personally negotiate with the Angami Chiefs. And when at
length it was thought that all our efforts had been in vain, and outrage heaped on outrage
had culminated in Bhogchand's murder, after the one short sharp lesson of punishment,
the policy adopted, not wisely perhaps but in all sincerity, was a policy of non-
interference—a withdrawal from all intimate relations with incorrigible natives. They
might attend our markets, if they came in peace, but we would not enter their hills
intrude on their quarrels. Such moderation was of course misunderstood. It was too
thoroughly English to be appreciated by ignorant Naga. It was the clearest and
most consistent by more polished nations.

It failed as a policy—signally failed. Fate seems determined to prove that there shall be
no rest for the English in India till they stand forth as the governors or advisers of each tribe
and people in the land. As regards the Nagas, this fact, doubtfully at times foreseen—this
policy, dimly now and again foreshadowed,—was grasped firmly and carried forward persistently
by the late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Direct control, personal influence, a mediatory
intercourse,—supported at the same time by adequate strength,—these were the measures Sir
Cecil Beadon never ceased to advocate as the only possibly successful policy in dealing with
hill tribes. Among the Angamis this system has hitherto promised well; and though it
too much to hope that all our difficulties are over; there is still sufficient encouragement to
Government to persevere. There is sufficient precedent to warrant such attempts elsewhere.

It would be a mistake to suppose that to inflict condign punishment for exceptionally
gross outrages is any departure from a general policy of conciliation. To submit to outrage
is not to conciliate, but to provoke to further attack. But punishment has never, with the
sanction of Government, taken the form of mere reprisal. Government has never
raiding parties to burn indiscriminately Naga villages. Its first aim has always been to
discover the actual parties concerned in the raids on British Territory, and then it has endeavoured
to confine the punishment to those so offending. The policy of a Government is not
to be learned from any single incident in its history. It must be viewed as a whole, in the
light of its acknowledged aims and motives.

"The Government of India should be informed that the Government of Manipur has been advised to send a deputation of frontiersmen to the Manipur frontier to ascertain the limits of the Manipur frontier."

"I beg to inform you that I have seen the letter in this paper, and I have been informed of the contents of the letter. I am sorry that the letter is not in the hands of the Government of India, but I am sure that the Government of India will be able to find out the contents of the letter."

"The following extracts from the correspondence of 1854-55 will show how the Government policy was supported at a later date. The Government of India reported that the Manipurees had invaded the hills and sacked the village of Muzomah which had always been well disposed to us. He urged upon the Government a policy of checking such incursions. The Governor General in Council wrote on 20th April 1855:-

"The Lordship in Council is of opinion that the British Government is not authorized to demand of the Government of Manipur that it should not invade the Angami country in future, except in connection with a demand made by itself. The Angami country, however, at least, not being allowed to be under the protection of the British Government."

"But before coming to a conclusion as to the particular case of invasion, he took notice by Colonel Jenkins, the Governor General in Council would wish to be more particularly informed of the relation in which the village of Muzomah and the tract of Angami country in which it is situated stands towards the British Government. Colonel Jenkins said that the Manipure Government knows the tract of Angami country in question to be under British protection and that the subject of the dispute was a demand for a boundary between their country and ours. It is this expression is to be understood literally, the demand is for a boundary of our country, but this seems hardly reconcilable with other parts of the correspondence."

"The Lordship in Council begs that Colonel Jenkins may be called upon to explain fully all the circumstances connected with the declaration of boundaries to which he alludes, and to say distinctly whether he considers the Angami tract in question to be British territory or not, or to be under British protection or not; and in any case to state the nature of his opinion."

The Agent upon receipt of this, reported on 5th June as follows:-

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1148 of the 4th June, calling upon me to state the circumstances connected with the declaration of boundaries between Manipur and Assam, and to state distinctly whether I consider the Angami tract in question to be British territory or not."

"With regard to the boundary, I beg to say that in Captain Bigge's report No. 2 of the 7th June 1841, forwarded to Government with my letter No. 39 of the 12th of that month, that Officer, alluding to the unsatisfactory state of the boundary as generally acknowledged, proposed that, during the next deputation of an Officer from Assam, the Political Agent at Manipur should be directed to join the expedition for the purpose of laying down the boundary to be agreed on."

Captain Bigge mentions that an expedition was sent to the country north of Manipore, and that the generally accepted line of boundary between Assam and Manipore, and the established boundary; the line was displayed in Captain Bigge's map of the North-East Frontier, and Captain Bigge's map of the survey of Manipore extends to this line, and connects with the Naga country north of Manipore, which was in accordance to that Government when Captain Bigge and myself crossed from Manipore to Assam in 1881.

"This map does not include a single village of the Angami Nagas, who were at the time independent of the Maniporees, and are really ~~so~~ to this day, although, since that time, there have been several times invaded by the Maniporees."

Captain Bigge's proposition was approved of by the Governor-General in Council. Mr. Secretary Maddock's letter No. 1192 of the 10th July 1881, and a copy was sent to the Political Agent at that letter for Captain Bigge to define a boundary line between the British and Manipore.

The boundary so defined was subsequently confirmed by the Hon. the President in Council in Mr. Secretary Baskby's letter No. 1202 of the 10th July 1882. In the 1st letter of Captain Bigge and Bigge, annexed to Captain Bigge's letter of the 2nd January 1883, is a statement that the boundary line there defined separates all the Angami country from the Naga country to the north of Manipore, and that this latter country exercised no control or authority north of that line, though an allusion is made in a separate paragraph to the claims of the Manipore Government on the grounds of priority of discovery."

These Nagas are generally called "Kutika" Nagas.

It is not aware what communications were made to the Political Agent at Manipore the observance of that line of boundary; but I presume that Government was duly informed of the orders of our Government by the Political Agent."

With regard to the subject of the Angami Nagas being under the protection of the British Government, I beg to say that in the 5th paragraph of Mr. Maddock's letter above quoted, a transcript of which I have the honor to annex in the margin, His Lordship in Council was pleased to approve of the suggestions of making verbal engagements from the Angami Nagas of submission to the British Government, and with a view to show that they were in submission

Para. 5. With the Angami Nagas in like manner His Lordship in Council would be satisfied that verbal engagements should be taken from them of submission to the British Government, and, although Lieutenant Bigge describes them as too poor to pay tribute, it appears expedient that some acknowledgment, however trifling, should be required to show their submission to the Government. If you consider it important at the present moment to insist upon these proofs of the submission of the Angami Nagas, you will bear in mind the importance attached by Government to putting our relations with them on this footing on the first favorable opportunity; for, it appears to the Governor-General in Council, that the only method by which we can expect to maintain permanent peace and tranquillity among these tribes, and to introduce that degree of prosperity and civilization of which the country they inhabit is eminently capable, will be found in the introduction of our own protective influence, and in their confidence in our good faith. It is the Government's intention to deem it expedient that, on the first favorable opportunity

we should insist on their paying as an acknowledgment in the way of tribute, as the proof of their fidelity."

"Acting up to these instructions, an Officer would have been detached the next season, and Mr. Grange had commenced his march towards the Angami hills for the purpose of receiving the submission of the Angami Chiefs, but the death of that gentleman on the road, and the removal of Captain Bigge, left Captain Gordon without an assistant, and he was therefore unable to carry out the views of Government by a personal expedition to the hills; but he called upon the Chiefs to attend him at Nowgong, and his summons was obeyed by the Chiefs of Konomah and Moromah, who entered into agreements for themselves and dependent villages to pay a tribute to Government, and to refer their trials to our Officers' adjudication."

"This result was reported to Government in my letter to Mr. Secretary Bishby, No. 26 of the 19th March 1846, and in Mr. Secretary Davidson's letter No. 192 of the 17th of April following was conveyed the expression of the entire satisfaction and approval of His Honour the President in Council in regard to those proceedings."

"These agreements were, indeed, repudiated by the headmen of the Konomah tribe on Mr. Wood's deputation to the hills in the following year, when Mr. Wood went up to the hills for the purpose of assembling the Chiefs and receiving their offerings as an acknowledgment of the supremacy of Government; but a part of the village at least remained faithful to their agreements, and many of the Chiefs of inferior villages did wait upon Mr. Wood with their presents."

"Our relations with the Angami Nagas were for the next two or three years interrupted by their outrages upon traders and villages within our territory and within that of Manipal, and also by their constant attacks on each other; but the instructions of Government to endeavour to conciliate the Nagas and engage them to acknowledge submission to our Government, were always steadily kept in view by our Officers; and during Captain Butler's expedition of 1846-47 that Officer received the submission of the most powerful villages in

the Angami hills, paying in their tribute and entering into solemn engagements of future good conduct and fidelity to the British Government."

* See Captain Butler's report No. 2 of the 10th February 1847, forwarded to Government with my letter No. 16 of the 25th March 1847.

"It was on this occasion, at the urgent solicitation of the Nagas, that Captain Butler established a Military and Police post on the hills at Samoogooding, under the superintendence of Bhog Chund Parogah."

"The subsequent murder of this Officer in July 1849 brought about the military expeditions of 1850-51, to which I need not advert further than to notice that they led to the entire withdrawal of our troops, and to the orders of Government against any further interference with the internal feuds of the Angami Nagas."

"The death of Bhog Chund arose out of the injudicious management by him of a quarrel between two clans of the same village, and could not, I conceive, be attributed to any denial of our supremacy; but there was reason to suppose, from subsequent enquiry, that Bhog

Chief had made himself disliked by many of the Nagas, and had almost lost his authority. Nevertheless, this result of his suppression of the hills, the experiment of placing an Officer in the Naga hills has I think, been so far successful that it led to a greatly increased intercourse with the Nagas, which has been going on increasing to this day. They have ever since been visiting our villages on the plains in large numbers for the purpose of traffic, and they have constantly sought opportunities of making themselves acquainted with the English dialect. Parties of young men have resided here at Nongang and Coimbatore for months together for the purpose of learning to read and write, and it appears to me that our connection with these Angami clans cannot now by any means be severed.

The Government may prevent our troops from ever again occupying their hills, but the disturbances with our villages, which first led us to become acquainted with the Angamis, have been repeated lately, and cannot possibly be prevented by any action of troops, and I feel persuaded that no series of punishment, however severe, will prevent the recurrence of similar barbarous attempts, unless the country is really and fully annexed.

Our daily increasing acquaintance with the habits and feelings of these Nagas leads me to believe that almost all the outrages on our villages have originated with blood feuds, which, as with all rude and uncivilized peoples in all parts of the world, they consider it their most sacred duty to prosecute and revenge by murder, and it is not possible for them to forgo this duty, nor to forgive any injuries, except through the mediation, and application of a third and superior power."

From time to time every Angami village has sought our protection and offered to pay tribute, and there is every reason for supposing that all the clans are unanimous in sincerely desiring this arrangement as their only chance of bringing to an end the state of extreme disturbance and hostility which prevails throughout their country, although, whilst they do so, every one may entertain the idea that he would still be able to follow up his old individual quarrels. It seems to me that it is only a change of religion, either by their becoming Hindus or Christians, that can effect an alteration in the religious regard with which they are now impelled."

I do not conceive that the orders of the Government, not to interfere with the internal arrangements of the Angami Nagas which have been strictly adhered to, can be said to have severed our connection with these Nagas at least they have not so understood them, and from their physical position, their habits and ways, their connection will be continued, and the only question to be considered in my opinion, is whether this connection is to remain in its present unsatisfactory state, or whether it can be improved for the benefit of both parties."

To this subject, one of great importance, with reference to the immense tract of country now rendered useless by the incursions of the Angamis, I shall have to advert shortly, and for the present I trust His Honor the Deputy Governor will believe that I am

have no possible objection to submitting my humble opinions to the Government, but to secure the tranquillity and jurisdiction of the country entrusted to my charge.

The Lieutenant-Governor (Sir F. Halliday) replied to this by the following Order (dated 20th November):—

"You have explained in your letter No. 10, dated the 5th of June, that the boundary which you spoke of in your previous letter No. 27 of the 24th March, regarding which the Supreme Government required an explanation, was a line adopted by Captain Pemberton and the Political Agent at Manipore many years back as the boundary of the Manipore territory, and in paragraph 7 of the same letter you have referred to certain orders of the Supreme Government in 1851 as affording warrant for speaking of the Angami Nagas as being 'under our protection,' regarding which expression the Supreme Government also required explanation."

"With reference to your explanations on these points, and to the opinions which you have now expressed, the Lieutenant-Governor has referred to much of the previous correspondence regarding the Angami Nagas, and has more especially perused with attention the correspondence which passed between yourself and the Supreme Government in 1850 and 1851."

"The Lieutenant-Governor finds that a very distinct line of policy was prescribed by the Most Noble the Governor-General and Council in 1851. The attempt to obtain control, or to establish sovereignty over the inhabitants of the Naga hills, was decidedly negatived, and you were informed that your efforts should be confined to the establishment of effective means of defence on the line of our own frontier, all interference with the internal affairs of the Naga tribes being especially avoided. Nothing appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to have since taken place, which should induce the Government to reverse the policy which was then declared in 1851."

"You express, it is true, a strong conviction that it is not possible to maintain the position towards these tribes which the Government desires to maintain, and at the same time to prevent them from making invasions upon our subjects. But the Lieutenant-Governor cannot admit that there is at present evidence of any real and earnest endeavour having been made to establish, with respect to the Naga tribes, the policy which the Government has decided. He does not infer from the correspondence which has been before him what special measures have been adopted, and what pains have been taken to explain to the Naga Chiefs the position which we desire to hold towards them, as indicated by the orders given to you in 1851. In the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion your personal action and views should have been brought to bear in this matter, for there can hardly have been, during the last few years, any day involving upon the office which you hold more important than the adjustment of our relations with the wild and heady tribes who border upon our Eastern frontier. And in saying this, the Lieutenant-Governor does not desire to conceal that, as at present informed he is not able to feel satisfied that this part of your duty has received that share of your personal interest and attention which its great importance assuredly demanded. He doubts whether it has not been left too much to the guidance of junior officers of the agency, whose energy and zeal, however good, and however praiseworthy, do

